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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Vince Chhabria, Judge

RICHARD KADREY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

VS.) NO. C 23-03417 VC

META PLATFORMS, INC.,

Defendant.

San Francisco, California Thursday, May 1, 2025

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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Thursday - May 1, 2025 1 10:00 a.m. 2 PROCEEDINGS ---000---3 All rise. THE CLERK: 4 5 Court is now in session. The Honorable Vince Chhabria is 6 presiding. Please be seated. 7 **ZOOM RECORDING:** Recording in progress. 8 THE CLERK: Calling Civil Action 23-3417, Kadrey, 9 et al., versus Meta Platforms. 10 Counsel, please approach the podium and state your 11 appearances for the record, beginning with counsel for 12 plaintiffs. 13 MR. BOIES: Good morning, Your Honor. David Boies, of 14 Boies Schiller and Flexner. I'd like to introduce also 15 16 colleagues from Boies Schiller who are here: Maxwell Pritt, 17 Jesse Panuccio, Joshua Stein, Margaux Poueymirou, and 18 Jay Schuffenhauer. 19 THE COURT: Hi, everybody. 20 MR. PRITT: Good morning. 21 MR. CLOBES: Good morning, Your Honor. Bryan Clobes, from Cafferty Clobes, for the plaintiffs as well. 22 THE COURT: Hi. 23 MR. CLOBES: Hi. 24 25 MS. GEMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Rachel Geman,

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Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein. I'm here along with my
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     colleague, Reilly Stoler.
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              THE COURT:
                          Hi.
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              MS. GEMAN:
                          Hi.
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              MR. BOIES: And, Your Honor, I would also like to
     introduce three of our clients, who are here in the court:
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     Christopher Farnsworth, Andrew Greer, and Rachel Snyder.
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              THE COURT:
                          Hi.
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              MR. BOIES: And we also have one of our experts,
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     Dr. David Choffnes, in the very unlikely event that the Court
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11
     would have any questions of him.
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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              THE CLERK: Your Honor, one other attorney.
              THE COURT: No problem.
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              MS. DJORDJEVIC: Good morning, Your Honor.
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     Nada Djordjevic, from DiCello Levitt, also here for plaintiffs.
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              THE COURT:
                          Hi.
              MS. DJORDJEVIC: Hi.
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              MR. GHAJAR: Good morning, Your Honor. Bobby Ghajar,
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     from Cooley, on behalf of Defendant Meta Platforms.
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              THE COURT: Good morning.
              MS. HARTNETT: Good morning, Your Honor.
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23
     Kathleen Hartnett, from Cooley, also on behalf of Meta.
     I -- if you don't mind, we'll introduce some of our other
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25
     counsel here today.
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              THE COURT:
                          Great.
              MS. HARTNETT: We have Mark Weinstein and Judd Lauter
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     from Cooley.
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              THE COURT:
                          Hi.
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              MS. HARTNETT: We have Anna Stapleton and
     William Marks from Paul Weiss, and Mr. Shanmugam will be doing
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     the arguing today for Paul Weiss from --
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              THE COURT: Mr. Shanmugam, you keep haunting my
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 9
     courtroom. What's going on?
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                                (Laughter.)
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              MR. SHANMUGAM:
                              For the record, as always, it's a
     pleasure.
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              THE COURT: All right.
                                      So --
              MS. DUNNING: Your Honor, sorry. One more.
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              THE COURT:
                          Oh.
                               I'm sorry.
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              MS. DUNNING: Angela Dunning, from Cleary Gottlieb
17
     Steen & Hamilton, on behalf of Meta.
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          Thank you.
              THE COURT:
                         Hi.
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              MS. DUNNING: Good morning.
21
                          Okay. Mr. Shanmugam, maybe I'll start
              THE COURT:
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     with you.
          You know, I put out -- I put out a bunch of questions
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     yesterday. I thought of more questions, and I almost put out
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     another list of questions at midnight last night, but I decided
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I shouldn't do that to you-all.

But I think, in a case like this, it's important probably to zoom out and just develop a general understanding of the issues that are presented by it and a general understanding of the issues that are presented by the AI copyright dispute; right?

I think it will be tempting for you to answer a lot of my questions by saying, "Well, there's nothing about that in the record" -- right? -- "and they didn't put anything in on that" or "They didn't argue that" or whatever.

And I assure you that there will be plenty of time to discuss what's in the record and what's not in the record, but I was wondering -- if you wouldn't mind beginning the discussion by just focusing on the issue in general without regard to any of the facts in this case.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Sure.

So I'm happy to do that, Judge Chhabria. And I think that, from our perspective, the key issues here relate to the nature of the use and the absence of a market for a substitute of use.

THE COURT: And I guess my -- my view is that -- I agree with you, but as -- between those two issues, it seems to me that the -- the most important question in these kinds of cases is if the use -- assuming the use is transformative -- right? -- even highly transformative -- and I think -- you

know, I mean, I had a couple questions about that, but I think that that's probably where we come out -- right? -- is that -- is that it's -- the use is highly transformative.

But we are told over and over again by the courts that the fourth factor is the most important -- right? -- and the effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted works is the most important issue.

And it seems to me that you could have a case where the use of the copyrighted works is highly transformative, but nonetheless, it could have a massive effect on the market for the copyrighted works such that it would not constitute fair use.

Do you agree -- again, without regard to the facts of this case or what's in the record in this case, do you agree with that statement?

MR. SHANMUGAM: So I partially agree with that statement. So let me explain why.

It is certainly true that the Supreme Court has said that the fourth factor is the most important factor, but the Court has also said that the two factors relate to each other. And I think that the critical respect in which they relate to each other is that, as the Second Circuit put it in the HathiTrust case -- and I think that this is the best articulation:

"Under Factor 4, any economic harm caused by transformative uses does not count because such uses, by

definition, do not serve as substitutes for the original work."

Now, why is that --

THE COURT: Well -- but I -- I understand that concept, and I understand that quote, but what the courts also tell us over and over again is that these fair use cases are very fact-dependent and very context-specific. And I think there's a real danger in taking quotes from cases that come out of very different contexts and mechanistically applying it to this very, very new context; right?

And this seems like a highly unusual case in the sense that, although the copying is for a highly transformative purpose, the copying leads to, or has the high likelihood of leading to, the flooding of the markets for the copyrighted works in a way that substantially diminishes the value of those works.

And I -- and I think that that, you know -- and, again, without regard to what evidence there is in the record of that in this case, I think that is the -- the most important issue, the most important question to be answered in these AI copyright cases.

And it gets at some of the examples I -- I gave in my questions; right? Like, you know, take the, you know -- well, let's take the -- let's take -- let's keep it completely outside the context of this case. I won't even use one of the plaintiffs as an example. Let's just take newspaper articles;

right? 1 If, you know, an AI company is downloading and copying 2 news articles, copyrighted news articles, without permission, 3 that -- en -- en masse -- that it seems very likely to lead to 4 5 the creation of a product that will have the capability of and likely will produce an infinite amount of content that will 6 7 diminish demand for the copyrighted works that were used to feed the model and to the point that -- you know, it's not 8 inconceivable to imagine that the market for the copyrighted 9 works that were fed into the model could be eliminated 10 11 entirely. And how could -- how could that be fair use? 12 MR. SHANMUGAM: 13 Sure. And I do think that that is what underlies -- I think it's 14 15 really Questions 2 through 5 that you sent us yesterday. 16 used the example of the domestic violence --17 THE COURT: Yeah, but now --MR. SHANMUGAM: -- article. 18 -- I'm using the example of the 19 THE COURT: 20 newspapers. So --

MR. SHANMUGAM: I think that the two examples come out the same way under our analysis, and I think, really, the critical question here is what market effects are cognizable under the fair use test. And that's relevant, I think, both for Factor 4 but, I think, more generally -- and I'm happy to

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talk about the purposes of the fair use test in the zoom-out as well.

So let me give you sort of our bottom-line answer and then explain why I think it's the correct one. Our bottom-line answer is that, for an effect to be cognizable, it has to relate to what is protected under the copyright laws, which is the expressive element of the work.

And so it would not be a cognizable effect merely to produce the definitive article on the roots of domestic violence. Keep in mind that that happens all the time. Take academia. Somebody may be a Shakespeare scholar and may write an article about Shakespeare that is the definitive analysis of <code>Hamlet</code>, and it may draw very extensively on existing scholarship.

But as long as it does not reproduce enough of the expression from those earlier articles, there's not going to be copyright infringement. And we think that the analysis comes out the same way --

THE COURT: What if you -- what if you copy those books without permission and then read them and then write the definitive work on Ham- -- Hamlet?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Right.

Our view is that the protected market effects, for purposes of the fourth prong, should operate in essentially the same way, which is to say that, in figuring out what effects

count, we are guided by the underlying purpose of the copyright laws, which is, after all, as the copyright clause says, to protect the progress of science and useful arts.

When you take a look at the case law -- and I would point as examples of this, but I think there are others -- to the Ninth Circuit's decisions in *Connectix* and *Accolade*, the morph -- the mere fact that you're producing a rival product that obviously is going to have some effect on the sales of the initial product is not enough.

And I would submit that it is for that reason. It is because you're drawing on the functional elements in the reverse engineering software cases in order to produce the alternative product, and, of course, this is all consistent with the broader principle that there are all sorts of effects in the fair use context.

There are the effects of a parody. There are the effects that the Supreme Court has recognized of a negative review.

And in all those cases, those effects are not cognizable.

THE COURT: But let me -- let me -- again, I mean, I don't want to sound like a broken record, but, you know, we are told over and over again that, you know, the fair use analysis is fact-dependent and context-specific; right?

And in the -- I think most of the cases, if not all of the cases you're referring to -- you have one product -- right? -- and it's a copyright-protected product, and somebody uses that

product or that work to develop another product or work, and the -- the product that is developed partly as a result of the copying is one product in the market that's competing with the copied product; right?

In this case, you have companies using copyright-protected material to create a product that is capable of producing an infinite number of competing products; right? So, to use the domestic violence example, you -- you know, you have a book on domestic violence and the causes of domestic violence and the -- the things we need to do to combat domestic violence.

And by -- by -- by training the product with copyrighted works relating to domestic violence, you are giving the product the ability to produce a million articles on domestic violence addressing the same issues that are addressed by the copyrighted work.

And so you are dramatically changing -- you might even say obliterating -- the market for that person's work, and you're saying that you don't even have to pay a license to that person for using their work to create the product that's destroying the market for their work. I just don't understand how that can be fair use.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Sure.

So let me address that directly. I'm going to start with an answer that you may not want to hear, which is that, in this case, it is a fact-dependent analysis, and there really is no

record of such an effect. At most, there is speculation about the possibility.

THE COURT: I understand that --

MR. SHANMUGAM: So --

THE COURT: -- and I assure -- I -- again, I assure you that we'll have plenty of time to talk about the record. That's what -- I think, in this case, the record relating to Factor 4 is the most important thing.

But I also think, in general, the issue of Factor 4 and how big of a deal it is, you know, when put up against the transformative effect of the -- of the product is -- is the most important.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah.

And just to set this on the table for purposes of the subsequent discussion here --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SHANMUGAM: -- I think that there are actually a variety of different types of effects that the other side could point to, and the one that we've been discussing is one that they conspicuously have not been relying on.

I think, if you take a look at plaintiffs' briefs -- and I hope that this is a fair characterization of their argument -- they're really relying on two things. First, they are relying on the purported market for licensing for this particular purpose.

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And, second, they are relying on an argument with regard to their claim about the reliance on the online data sets, that they were deprived of sales of their product that could have been used in lieu of obtaining these works from Book 3 and the like. THE COURT: Those seem like sort of the flip side of the same coin, as far as I can tell. MR. SHANMUGAM: Well, I think that there are slightly different responses to both of them. But in the end, I think, with regard to the -- the relevance of these market effects, our view is the same with regard to really all of them, which is that if you think that it is a highly transformative use -- that the market for those transformative uses cannot be the correct market for purposes of Factor 4. THE COURT: Well -- but -- I mean, I think I would agree with you to an extent on that; right? And let me make sure we're understanding each other. MR. SHANMUGAM: Sure. THE COURT: So I agree that, you know, you -- you know, the -- let's say that we consider the transformative use to be the development of an AI model that is capable of doing all these things.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yes. We would agree with that

Is that how you would characterize it?

description of the use.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So -- so that's the transformative use, but if the -- well, we'll agree on that for the moment.

The -- I certainly agree with you that we -- we're not -we shouldn't be considering the entire market for all of the
uses that the new model can be put to; right? But the new
model is capable of producing works that are in the same genre
of, or quite comparable to, the works produced by the -- by
the -- by the -- by the people whose material was fed into the
model; right?

And if we -- if we analyze those works -- right? -- the works that the model produces that are similar to, or in the same genre of, the works of the people whose material was copied, I think the likely conclusion is that the -- the transformative use will come close to obliterating the market for the works of the people whose material was copied.

And I just don't -- to say -- I mean, in a doctrine that is so fact-specific and so context-specific and so -- and a doctrine that tells us that different factors and different effects may be important in one case and not another, I just don't see how we can bury our head in the sand to that -- that likelihood.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah.

So I think we're a little bit hamstrung here in two

respects. First, again, I really don't think this is the theory that the plaintiffs have relied on.

THE COURT: I --

MR. SHANMUGAM: And, second, we don't have a record to that effect. But if we did have such a record, I'd want a joint issue. If we found ourselves, two years from now, in a world in which there was a robust record that AI tools were having this impact --

THE COURT: Well, I don't know if you need to wait until it has the impact; right? I mean --

MR. SHANMUGAM: Potential effects can count. So -THE COURT: Potential effects can count.

And I would think, to put it in practical terms -right? -- if the plaintiff had come here -- plaintiffs had come
here, you know, to this summary judgment hearing with an expert
report that laid out, in reliable terms, that the process of
feeding all this copyrighted work into the model will -- will
create a likelihood that massive amounts of content will be
produced by Llama that will sort of serve as potential
substitutes for the plaintiff's works, then I think you -- I
think you would -- you might lose on summary judgment or -- or
at trial -- right? -- because this factor is -- I mean, if -if it's important to consider what I just described, then I -you know -- and I think you're -- I think you're destined to
failure in these cases.

Well, let me push back on that a 1 MR. SHANMUGAM: little bit --2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. SHANMUGAM: -- with respect, Your Honor, as a 4 5 matter of law. And, again, I'm going to go right back to the 6 purpose of copyright law. The copy- -- purpose of copyright law is to protect 7 expression. And when you take a look at the enumerated rights 8 that are listed in the Copyright Act, you know, first and 9 foremost is the exclusive right to reproduce your expression. 10 11 Again, throughout copyright law, expression is protected; ideas are not. 12 13 And the consequence --THE COURT: But how -- but it's -- how can you say 14 15 that the expression is not being reproduced when the copying of the expression gives the machine the ability to engage in 16 17 similar expression? 18 MR. SHANMUGAM: But then transformation takes place; 19 You know, the transformation here is that the machine 20 is not retaining the expression. The machine is being trained in a very specific way. It's being trained in the 21 relationships between words, between tokens, which can be parts 22 of words. 23 And so the expression falls out of the equation and --24 THE COURT: But if -- how does it fall out of the 25

equation if -- I mean, I'm assuming that if -- if Meta were unable to train its model with any domestic-violence-related content, then the model would not be capable of producing a <code>New Yorker-style</code> article that goes -- goes on at length about the causes of domestic violence and what we need to do to combat it; right?

MR. SHANMUGAM: That -- that may be true, but, again,

I come back to the fact that what copyright law doesn't protect

against is what takes place, for instance, in my academic

hypothetical.

So, in other words, you're not entitled to protection from competition in the marketplace of ideas. What copyright law is giving you is a limited monopoly. It's a monopoly in your expression itself, and I think one way I sort of find this --

THE COURT: Right, but if I'm going to -- if I'm going to steal things from the marketplace of ideas in order to develop my own ideas, that's copyright infringement; right? I mean, if I'm a professor and I distribute -- if I buy a book, and I make 18 photocopies of it, and I distribute the 18 photocopies to my students, that's copyright infringement.

And the fact that the students are going to absorb the 18 -- the books, along with a bunch of other material that they will absorb, and then do -- create things that may compete with the original book doesn't absolve you from copyright infringement in that -- in that -- on that fact pattern, does

it?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well -- and I think that that is right, but I think that that's because the analogy to humans is imperfect, and it's imperfect in two respects.

THE COURT: Well, you just made it. So -- for the record.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well -- well -- but -- but, for the record, to respond to Question Number 1, I think the reason why humans are different is, first, because the training of an AI tool like Llama is different for the reasons that I alluded to. The AI tool is being trained in this very specific, narrow way.

It is very different from a human being reading a book, which is, after all, the purpose for which books are originally written. And I also think that, here, you have a tool at the end of it. That is the use, as we discussed. The use is the development of this particular tool, and I don't think you can describe the development of a human as a use.

That human is then going to go on and engage in particular uses, which may be transformative or not. But, again, I want to sort of come back to where we started here in this particular colloquy and really drill down on this question of what exactly it is that these, as you described them, rival works would be doing.

I think there are a couple of possibilities. One is that they are taking content, which, of course, is unprotected --

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that's the idea/expression dichotomy -- and producing that
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     content for -- potentially in a more attractive way. And,
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     again, that's the sort of competition that I think the
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     copyright laws do not protect against. That's the balance of
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     the copyright laws. Expression is protected; underlying ideas
 6
     are not.
          There is a similar version of this that you see, to some
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     extent, in the materials, which is the question of style.
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     so if you have a singer who comes along and produces works in
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     the style of Taylor Swift, but they're more attractive to
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     listeners than Taylor Swift's own works, again --
                          That's impossible.
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              THE COURT:
                                   I -- I --
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              MR. SHANMUGAM:
                              No.
14
                                (Laughter.)
                              Of course, for the record, I agree
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              MR. SHANMUGAM:
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    with that.
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          But, ultimately, that is not protected by the copyright
     laws, either, and that's really what these arguments sound in.
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     These arguments, in the end, relate to things that the
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     copyright laws don't protect against. Now, in the world of AI,
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     perhaps we would want there to be such protection, but --
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              THE COURT: But here -- here's -- let's stay -- let's
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     stay on the Taylor Swift example for a second, shall we?
              MR. SHANMUGAM:
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                              Sure.
              THE COURT: So I think -- I think I agree with
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everything that you said about Taylor Swift -- right? -- that if -- you know, if you feed her works and a bunch of other works into an AI model, and you then ask the A model -- AI model to produce songs in the style of Taylor Swift, that is not going to affect the market for Taylor Swift songs; right?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well --

THE COURT: And even if -- even if a million songs are produced by the model in the style of a Taylor Swift song, it's not going to affect the market for Taylor Swift songs.

But what about the next Taylor Swift? What about the -the up-and-coming, relatively unknown artist who is writing
songs and copyrighting songs, and the -- Meta uses her works
and feeds them into the -- the model? And by feeding
copyrighted works like hers into the model, it enables the
model to produce a billion pop songs; right?

It makes it much less likely that that new artist is going to break through and become the next Taylor Swift because the market has been so dramatically changed for songs in the style that this new artist is writing.

MR. SHANMUGAM: So I think you could have that effect even on the great Taylor Swift. You could have that effect on a new artist.

But I think our answer is the same, that that is the sort of competitive effect that the copyright laws do not protect against. And, again, I acknowledge that, in some cases, you

might have a stronger factual case that --1 But, again, I'm --2 THE COURT: MR. SHANMUGAM: -- that's taking place. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Sorry to interrupt. 4 But the one other thing I would say on 5 MR. SHANMUGAM: this, though, is that that is where substantial similarity 6 comes into play in the ordinary infringement context. 7 So there could come a point at which, if a model produced 8 a song that was close enough in expression, or if a model 9 10 produced a work that, as has decidedly not been proven with 11 regard to Llama, reproduces the expression of an author in a sufficiently similar way, of course, then you have a relevant 12 effect because you have a work that can be characterized as 13 substitutive, and you would have ordinary infringement as well. 14 15 Those two concepts, I think, need to be understood in the 16 same way, and I really do think that that's why the cases talk 17 about this in terms of substitutive effects as opposed to other 18 effects. And otherwise, I think --THE COURT: Right, but -- but -- but substitutive 19 20 effects is -- it seems to me, is a relevant concept here. I 21 mean, I think -- aren't -- aren't we discussing substitutive effects when we talk about the person who's trying to become 22 23 the next Taylor Swift and the market is flooded with similar songs partially as a result of copying her song? 24

Why isn't that not -- why aren't we talking about

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substitutive effects there?

MR. SHANMUGAM: I think the reason we aren't is precisely because it is not substitution of a work with similar expressive content. And I think that the problem with all of this is, otherwise, I think you lead very quickly to a circularity problem because -- and I think, actually, the best way to understand this is with regard to the argument that the plaintiffs are making with regard to the development of a license market for this particular AI person.

THE COURT: I understand your arguments about that, and I agree with you. So I don't know if it's necessary to talk about that argument that they're making.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Oh. I'm happy -- well, as you're aware, when the Supreme Court itself has sort of talked about the fourth factor, it has, quoting the *Nimmer* treatise, talked about the fact that, in any fair use case, you can say that that is true.

And so I think the way to kind of break the circle here is to say, look, again, when you have a highly transformative use, by definition, what you say is that those uses do not qualify as relevant substitutes for Factor 4.

THE COURT: Right.

And I think -- I think the problem -- I think the difference we're having is that, in my view, you're -- you're taking a highly formalistic approach to this guestion in an

area of law that tells us not to do that; right?

I mean, it -- I think that it's probably true that, in most copyright cases, you need to look at, you know, the first factor in the way that you're describing it, but it's -- as Justice Breyer and others have told us over and over again, it's -- we're not supposed to be taking that highly formalistic approach such that we are mechanistically applying the concept from one case to the next case. It really depends on the facts.

And in this case, you know -- well, not this -- maybe not this particular case, but in this area, in this type of case, what I'm saying is that it seems highly plausible, at a minimum, that copying people's protected works and using it to train models will, in some con- -- in some situations, come close to obliterating the market for the work of the person whose material is copied.

And the reason is that the copier is not just producing one work. The copier has the capability of producing a billion works and completely changing the market for this -- this type of work, and you seem to be telling me that, in the fair use -- in the fair use analysis, I have to ignore that; I have to disregard that possibility. And I just don't think that that is how the fair use doctrine works.

So I think that's inconsistent with what the courts have told us about how to think about fair use doctrine.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yes. So let me say a couple of things about that.

First, one of the questions you asked was the question of whether or not you have a case where there is a transformative use, and yet the courts have said not fair use because of the market effects.

And we are unaware of any case -- I don't think that the plaintiffs have cited any -- where you have a highly transformative use and that has been found to be the case.

THE COURT: What if you took out the word "highly"?
What if you said "a transformative use," not "a highly
transformative use"?

MR. SHANMUGAM: So there are a couple of cases, I believe, from the Second Circuit. There is the Fox News case.

There is also the Warner Bros. case.

But they're not really great cases because, in the Fox News case, I think that there is a genuine question about how transformative the use actually was. And in the Warner Bros. case, the court said that the use was transformative and yet said that the first factor pointed in the plaintiff's direction.

So neither one of them, I think, is a very good fit for this situation.

THE COURT: Well -- but -- but how transformative -- I mean, that gets us to the question of -- of how to think of the

issue of transformative in this case. How transformative is the use when the works that are being produced are cheap imitations of the original?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well, I think, in that circumstance -- and, again, I am not going to fight you on the facts other than to, once again, point out that we don't really have a record on any aspect of this.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. SHANMUGAM: So we are engaging in -- in speculation as a factual matter, but I want to really directly address the real concern, and I'll bring it back to broader principles as well.

So I think, when it comes to the transformative nature of the use, again, this is a context in which it is quite clear that the inability to reproduce expression is a large part of what makes this use transformative.

As the Court is aware, the primary case we rely on is Google Books, and that is a context in which even those snippets of the expression itself are reproduced. The court still said transformative use, in part, because of the broader purpose for which those snippets were being used.

THE COURT: Yeah.

And I -- and the *Google* case is very helpful as far as it goes. But, you know, in the *Google Books* case, there wasn't -- a product wasn't created that -- that had the -- as a result of

the copying that had the ability to produce a billion new works in the same genre as the work that was copied.

MR. SHANMUGAM: It's not an unhelpful case to us in the sense that I think that the Second Circuit --

THE COURT: It's not unhelpful, but I just don't -and it's helpful because it's a really good description of
copyright law, but I -- I think that case underscores the point
I'm making, which is that it's all context-specific.

And in this case, unlike that case -- or in these types of cases, unlike that case, you have -- you're creating a product that has the ability to create a billion works that it -- or likely has the ability to create a billion works that are similar to the work that's being copied.

MR. SHANMUGAM: So Google Books is a really helpful case to us, just to be clear, and it's really helpful to us because I think it's the closest analogue, at the appellate level, to what's going on here. But I think it's helpful to us even --

THE COURT: But why is it -- if it doesn't -- how could it be such a close analogue if it doesn't have what I just described?

MR. SHANMUGAM: But it's helpful to us even with regard to the Factor 4 issue, which we've been discussing, because, of course, the Second Circuit recognized that some individuals might be looking for the snippets that are

reproduced by *Google Books* and, therefore, that the authors would lose sales of the books as a result.

And yet the court nevertheless concluded, in that context, that there was fair use.

THE COURT: And that makes sense to me. I mean, if -if you're -- you are -- what you're doing is you're putting up
the transformative use against the effect on the market --

MR. SHANMUGAM: Correct.

THE COURT: -- for the copied work; right?

And just because the market for the copied work is affected to a degree doesn't automatically mean that the defendant loses on fair use -- right? -- because it may be that the work is so transformative and the effect on the market for the copied work is so de minimus or minimal that, when you're balancing, you know, the defendant comes out ahead.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well --

THE COURT: But I think the problem is that the effect -- the potential effect on the market for the copied work in this case is so much more tectonic than in Google Books.

MR. SHANMUGAM: So I want to point you to what the Supreme Court said in its most recent fair use case on this, and it was quoting from the *Google Books* case when it said this.

It said, quote, "The more the appropriator is using the

copied material for new transformative purposes, the more it serves copyright's goal of enriching public knowledge, and the less likely it is that the appropriation will serve as a substitute for the original or its possible derivatives, shrinking the protected" -- "the protected market opportunities of the copyrighted work."

THE COURT: Right.

And that, I think, gets to the question that I asked you, and then I think -- before you had a chance to answer it, I think I interrupted you, but -- and I apologize for that.

But, you know, how transform- -- if the -- if the use that is affecting the market for the copied work is the production of similar works, cheap imitations of those works, whatever you want to call it -- right? -- how transformative is it really?

MR. SHANMUGAM: So it won't surprise you to hear me say that we do not think that that's a fair way to characterize the purpose of AI tools. AI tools have all sorts of purposes.

THE COURT: Not the purpose of AI tools, but it's the -- but if you're comparing the -- the use that the copyright holder is complaining of -- right? -- copyright holder -- again, you could imagine -- you know, you can imagine it -- let me think of -- let me see if I can think of another example.

You know, cookbooks. I'm the author of a cookbook, and I -- you know, you're feed- -- it's a copyrighted work, and

you're feeding my book into the model to train it, and you're feeding other copyrighted cookbooks into the model to train it.

And as a result, what is happening is people are producing -- people have now -- are producing billions of cookbooks using artificial intelligence, and there's really no -- no longer -- the market for my book has become so diluted that it's not even worth writing another cookbook because I'm not a famous chef. I'm up-and-coming; right? I'm not the Taylor Swift of cookbooks. I'm the next Taylor Swift -- or I want to be the next Taylor Swift of cookbooks.

And, you know, so if it -- in a case like that, the plaintiff comes in and complains that the conduct that's being engaged in is the creation of a -- of a system that allows for -- that causes the proliferation of cookbooks in a way that obliterates the market for my cookbook, I think you can't answer that by saying, "Well, AI does a lot of other things, too."

You have to say -- I think the question is, you know,
"It's great that AI does a lot of other things, but is there a
way to prevent AI from proliferating a billion new cookbooks?"
And if there's not a way to prevent AI from proliferating a
billion new cookbooks, then you need to pay a license to the
author of the cookbook that you -- that you used to train your
model.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Sure.

So let me -- there are a lot of parts to that. So let me --

THE COURT: Pay royalty, I should say. Sorry.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah.

So let me address each of those -- each part of that. I'd point to the fact that AI has much broader and very different purposes, really primarily for purposes of underscoring how highly transformative it is. I think all of that is fair game for purposes of Factor 1 because, under Factor 1, you are looking at the purpose and character of the use.

So the fact that it has this broader purpose is highly germane and relevant to that analysis. I think what we have really been focusing on is the question of what Factor 4 is designed to address.

And I think one thing that is really important, whether we're talking about cookbooks or whether we're talking about the next Taylor Swift -- I think, in both of those circumstances, the fact that a technology comes along and has an effect on the ability of a new artist or a cookbook author is not enough, in and of itself, to give rise to a problem such that there is no fair use because, regardless of whether the tool trains on the works of that new artist or whether it trains on the works of the cookbook, whether it's a cookbook author or whether it's the new Taylor Swift, in either of those circumstances, you could still have exactly the same effect,

and it's an effect that the copyright laws do not protect against.

And I think maybe the best example of this in the case law is the *Sony Betamax* case. Now, keep in mind that that was a case where the court concluded that there was fair use, even absent transformation, and that was a context in which a lot of the same arguments about the effect of this on the marketplace for film, for television shows were made. And yet the Supreme Court said that is not enough to defeat the conclusion that there is fair use, and I think that the same is true here.

I think, when you look at both the Supreme Court's cases and the cases in the Courts of Appeals, you have similar broad arguments about the effect of rival products, the effects on sales. And the Supreme Court has focused on effects that are relevant to the expression that is being protected and effects that relate to non-tran- -- substitution in the market for non-transformative products.

And so that is really the line that we're trying to extract from these cases. Now, what is the principle underlying this line? I think it is the principle that I cited earlier, which is the principle underlying the whole copyright system, the balance that the copyright system strikes between, on the one hand, protecting authors' expression and, on the other hand, ensuring innovation, promoting the progress, as I discussed earlier, of science and the useful arts.

THE COURT: But how is -- how is that -- how is that balance struck properly if your -- if a company is allowed to copy somebody's work without protection -- without permission, and that is going to result in the creation of a product that could obliterate the market for that person's work?

I just -- I mean, the balance between protecting somebody's right to expression and the -- the need to promote innovation -- I just don't see how that balance is struck properly by allowing a company to download protected works without permission, not pay for them, and use it to -- to create a product that is capable, and probably likely, to destroy the market for the copyrighted work.

MR. SHANMUGAM: So, again, I -- you know, we have a statute that sets out these factors. And I think, as a practical matter, the way that the statute currently strikes that balance is by protecting transformative uses and protecting transformative uses in the absence of a market effect on the non-transformative aspects of the market, which is to say the expressive aspects of the market. And that is the balance that Congress has currently struck.

And I think, in an area like this involving a new technology, I would respectfully submit that a court should be reticent about wading in in a way that would impede the development of that new market, at least absent some direction from Congress.

THE COURT: What is the evidence that it would impede
the development of the new market to -- to rule that that -the companies developing these products are required to pay -or required to get a license to use copyrighted works?

MR. SHANMUGAM: So leaving aside the effects of damages awards and the other remedies that are being sought on a class-wide basis by the plaintiffs in this case, I would really point to the impracticality of developing a licensing regime on which -- I would submit that the record before this Court is clear.

The record before this Court reflects that a licensing regime, especially in this context, in the context of trade books, would be impractical and has not developed. And as this Court is aware, the plaintiffs have pointed to only one example, the example of an agreement between another technology company and another publisher, which is an agreement for online access that proved, as the record illustrates, not to be effective even as to the authors --

THE COURT: You're telling me that these companies couldn't figure out how to develop a market for copyrighted works if it was important to use the copyrighted works to develop their AI technology?

MR. SHANMUGAM: I think that the fundamental problem that gives rise to a market failure in this context is the fact that any individual work has relatively low value for purposes

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of training one of these tools, and the rights to these books
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     are held not by the publishing houses but by the individual
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     authors.
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          And so -- and, again, I think that we do run fairly
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     quickly into this circularity problem, which is that, unless
     the plaintiffs can come forward with an actual record to this
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     effect, what we're really talking about is the mere possibility
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     that, in the face of a finding of no fair use, such a market
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     could theoretically develop, which the Supreme Court has told
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     us is not cognizable for purposes of Factor 4.
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              THE COURT: Let me look at my list of questions to see
     if there's -- there are any other questions I want to pose to
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     you regarding, you know, this AI copyright issue generally --
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              MR. SHANMUGAM:
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                              Sure.
                         -- before we turn to the record and --
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              THE COURT:
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              MR. SHANMUGAM:
                              Sure.
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              THE COURT: -- you know -- it seems like so long ago
     that I wrote these questions.
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                                (Laughter.)
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                              It wasn't so long ago that we received
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              MR. SHANMUGAM:
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     them, but --
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                                (Laughter.)
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                          No.
                               I mean, I wrote them the same day
              THE COURT:
     that you received them.
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                                (Laughter.)
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THE COURT: Oh, yeah. 1 There's at least one. Hold on. 2 I quess I'd -- I'd like to -- I'd like to talk a 3 little bit more about different types of works and -- and how 4 5 it might affect the way we think about cases like this, 6 including this case -- right? -- because the -- the plaintiffs 7 have -- I think there are, what, like, 12 or 14 plaintiffs or something like that. 8 And -- and, you know, one or two of them have written 9 nonfiction. I believe that one or two have writ- -- of them 10 11 have written memoirs. I think there's a -- there's a poet; right? And there are -- and it's mostly -- other than that, I 12 think it's all fiction authors; right? 13 It seems like -- and, again, without regard to the record 14 15 in this case, it seems like, in these cases, the -- the effect 16 of AI models on the market for the copyrighted works will often 17 really depend on what type of work it is. 18 For example, there was a reason I chose the domestic 19 violence example -- right? -- because intuitively, at least, it 20 seems easier to imagine the market for nonfiction -- protected 21 nonfiction works being diminished more rapidly than the market for fiction works; right? 22 And I used the example of newspaper articles; right? 23

even easier, I think, to imagine the market for copyrighted
newspaper articles being diminished extremely rapidly by using

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copyrighted news articles to train an AI model. I think it -with visual art, it's probably easy to imagine pretty quickly
the market being diminished. Fiction is a little bit harder.

And so, again, maybe without -- I'm not trying to get into the record on this case yet, but I was wondering if you could comment on that. I mean, do you -- do you agree there are going to be significant differences, even -- I know you don't accept the idea that I can even consider this as part of the fair use analysis; right?

But assuming I disagree with you about that, what -- is it going -- is -- is it going to be a very different market analysis, depending on what type of work it is?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well, I think this actually brings out an issue that we have been talking about, which is that I think it's no accident that the hypotheticals that we've been focusing on are domestic violence, newspaper articles, et cetera, because those are contexts in which the secondary work that is produced is a work that draws on facts and ideas.

In the newspaper contexts, that's probably clearest.

Chances are that, when we're in the context of a newspaper article, it's not that the AI tool is producing a work that draws on the expression of a distinctive -- right? -- or like

Maggie Haberman. It's probably drawing on what she's reporting about what's going on in the administration, unprotected facts, unprotected ideas.

And it's a lot harder, in the context of fiction -- of fiction, to come up with an analogue to that. But I think the closest analogue is work produced in the style of Junot Díaz, and that's like our Taylor Swift hypothetical from earlier. And the problem with that, again, is that the style is not protected; the expression is.

So in the context of visual art, if you have visual art that is produced that is substantially similar in the form of the expression, that can give rise to copyright infringement. That would be protected if you created an alternative market for work that was sufficiently similar.

So I think this all fits together in terms of the application of the principle -- or at least the principle that we are advancing. I think it is a lot harder to know how it would work in a world in which you are just measuring diminution in sales, regardless of the extent to which the alternative product contains an expressive component.

It seems like that's probably going to have to end up being a factual question, one way or another. And, again, we don't have a record at all, in this context, to show that that's taking place with regard to these particular plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay. So -- so now, at long last,

let's -- let's turn to the record in this case, and, you know,

you've heard what I view to be the most important issue for,

you know, deciding this type of case. You may disagree with

me, but you've -- you've heard what I believe to be the most important issue.

I don't think that anybody can win one of these cases without winning pretty decisively on Factor 4; right? I think that's the only path to victory in a case like this for a plaintiff.

And so what -- what is the -- what is the -- what do we have in the summary judgment record about the issues that we've been talking about in terms of the ability of the model to flood the market with works that are similar to the works of the -- similar to the copied works?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Sure.

So this is really a question, in the end, for the plaintiffs, but let me offer my characterization of what I think we have in the record, which is not very much, with regard to the type of market effect that you had posited at the beginning.

So, you know, their expert on these issues is Spulber, and I think that the most that can be said --

THE COURT: And Spulber is an economist; right?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yes.

THE COURT: Not -- not an expert on AI and what sort of thing it's going to produce -- things it's going to produce and all that; right?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Correct.

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And when you take a look at Spulber, I think that the most that can be said about Spulber, you know, reading the testimony charitably, is that he speculated about the possibility that the outputs of AI tools could compete for attention in the way that we have been discussing. That's Paragraphs 192 to 203 of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 126. But then he goes on to say that he's not aware of any particular instance in which this has occurred as to the plaintiffs. He says, "You are not aware" -- the question was, "You're not aware of any instance when output generated by Meta AI acted as a substitute for one of plaintiffs' books?" No, I'm not." And that's Mr. Ghajar's "Answer: Exhibit 25, at Pages 247 to 248. So that's from the deposition testimony. THE COURT: Right. MR. SHANMUGAM: That is all we have with regard to that particular effect --THE COURT: Yeah, but -- but --MR. SHANMUGAM: -- and so --

THE COURT: But I don't -- I think you agreed with me earlier that it's -- that it's -- a plaintiff is not required to present evidence that it's already happening; right? They could present evidence that it's about to happen, or it's likely to happen; right?

If -- if this chain of events is set off or allowed to

continue -- and when I say "chain of events," I mean a chain of events that includes downloading these works without permission and without paying royalties -- this is what's going to happen to the market.

I mean, if there were a -- if there were a reliable expert opinion that presented something like that, that would presumably be enough to go to trial on the fourth factor; right?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well -- so, you know, again, I do want to respectfully reiterate that, from our perspective, this is not the relevant market, as a matter of law. I would also acknowledge, as I did earlier, that the fourth factor looks at the effect upon the potential market.

I do think that it is, you know, incumbent on a plaintiff, recognizing that we bear the ultimate burden -- but, of course, we're trying to prove a negative, which is something the courts have recognized is -- is particularly challenging with regard to the fourth factor.

And I think, in this circumstance, it's incumbent on a plaintiff, once the relevant market has been identified, to come forward with at least some evidence to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether such a market is likely to arise.

THE COURT: Well -- but let me -- could I -- could I ask you about that --

1 MR. SHANMUGAM: Sure. -- as it gets to the burden of proof --2 THE COURT: MR. SHANMUGAM: Yes. 3 -- and the fact that fair use is a defense 4 THE COURT: 5 and all of that? You -- what evidence have you put in that the market 6 7 concerns that I'm expressing are not likely to materialize? it -- have you put in any evidence to that effect? Maybe your 8 answer is, "Well, they didn't really argue what you're arguing 9 now, and so we didn't need to put in any evidence." 10 11 MR. SHANMUGAM: Well, I do think that that is our answer in part because, again, when it comes to the relevant 12 market effects, we, as the Court would be aware, put in 13 evidence that expression cannot be reproduced by our model. 14 15 And that's the so-called regurgitation issue. 16 I think it is undisputed that this model cannot, when 17 prompted, reproduce meaningful portions of expression --THE COURT: And as an aside, it does seem like Meta 18 19 has done a good job perhaps, compared to a number of other 20 companies, you know, with implementing mitigations to prevent 21 its product from regurgitating. 22 MR. SHANMUGAM: Right. 23 And on that issue, I would point to the Ungar declaration, which explains in great detail how the Llama model operates. 24

It makes clear that the Llama model, as it is constructed, can

reproduce, on average at most, one additional token, which is a word or a portion of a word, and that that is, in large part, as a result of the fact that Meta has taken great pains, through deduplication, to prevent the model from excessively training on a particular work such that it reproduces the expression.

Now, the other aspect of this that was debated is this question of licensing and the issues with the licensing market.

And on that, I would point to our expert, Dr. Michael

Sinkinson, who walked through, you know, all of the difficulties in the creation of a market for this purpose.

And I've already pointed to the fact that individual books have negligible value for purposes of training. I've pointed to the fact that, in the context of trade books, which is somewhat different from the context of other media -- that the right to license the book rests with the author.

So there's no one place you can go in the way that there is in music, for instance, where you have clearinghouses like ASCAP and BMI. And I've also pointed to the fact that -- and Sinkinson also pointed to the fact that these large language models require, you know, large quantities of text.

And so one of the challenges here is that it would be impractical -- and I don't think there's really any dispute about this -- for a company like Meta to go to authors one by one for purposes of this training.

In order to have an effective large language model -- and Ungar talks about this at great length -- you need to have --

THE COURT: And one -- one just quick sidebar -- is buying the e-book is not enough -- right? -- because the use would be beyond the license that you get when you buy the e-book; right?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yes, that is correct.

And I think one thing that is really important to keep in mind -- and this goes back to the hypotheticals involving humans -- is that this is a context where you're talking about a digital tool. You have to have copying in order to train the tool. You have to have a digital copy. That digital copy gets replicated in the training process.

And so that's one thing that's a little bit different from, say, the human context, where the copying itself is not necessary. That's relevant to Factor 3, and it's relevant to the fair use analysis in other regards. And, again, I think that the record is undisputed in this regard, that the more materials you have to train, the better.

And those materials, of course, include both copyrighted and non-copyrighted materials. It's not just in the trade books context but beyond. You know, one of the things that is discussed in the briefs is how necessary is it for us to show that we needed any particular work.

And I would submit that that is not the appropriate

Case 3:23-cv-03417-VC Document 590 Filed 05/09/25 Page 46 of 113 analysis for purposes of fair use. Instead, the question, as 1 was true in the thumbnail cases like Kelly and Perfect 10, is 2 would you have a better model if you had more materials, 3 including the copyrighted materials in question? 4 THE COURT: Anything else you want to say about the record? I don't think so. 7 MR. SHANMUGAM: I think that that addresses the issues that you raised in your questions 8 concerning the state of the record. 9 I think I would just make the broader point that I think 10 11 that one of the things that is hazardous in this area is that it is very tempting to speculate about what might happen to the 12 market, and this is obviously a moving target. The way these 13 issues may look two or three years from now, when this gets to 14 15 the Supreme Court, may be very different from the way they look

I would submit that that is really a reason to focus on the record as it exists now in this case and to write an opinion that --

> THE COURT: Yeah.

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now.

And I just want to be clear that, of course, the -- you know, the focus for deciding this case is on the record that -in this case.

But I do think that, in a case like this, which is, you know, more important than the average case we get, even in the Northern District of California, it is important to sort of develop an overall understanding of the legal issues presented before diving into the facts of the case.

So that's why I wanted to --

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah. No. Understood.

And, look, I think we all recognize that there is no exact context here in terms of the prior precedent. Again, we think the *Google Books* case is probably the closest case, but AI does present distinctive issues that the prior cases do not squarely address.

I think our fundamental submission here is that you have to go back to the underlying purposes of copyright law, the underlying purposes of the fair use doctrine. We think that they support our position here.

And to the extent that AI presents distinctive problems, the Court should be cautious about imposing crushing copyright liability that would really throttle this industry, particularly in a context where it may very well be that Congress needs to act to address these issues. A lot of these issues concerning an artist --

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I think what you're saying is a little bit question-begging; right? Imposing crushing copyright liability that would really throttle the -- I mean, if the -- if it was illegal for the companies to download copyrighted material and use it to train the products, then

they're going to be subject to liability.

that.

And the -- I don't think -- I mean, you seem to be saying that it would be bad for these companies or it would be bad for AI if you -- if you impose liability for copyright infringement, and that cannot be --

MR. SHANMUGAM: Of course. Of course, Judge Chhabria.

THE COURT: I'm sure you didn't mean to be saying

MR. SHANMUGAM: No. I think what I am saying, however, is that this really goes to the issues that we were discussing a minute ago about the impracticality of training these tools through another means.

In other words, precisely because it was impossible to license, the companies went this route of -- and not just Meta, but other companies as well went the route of using these online repositories, where they could get large quantities of language in order to train these tools effectively.

And, of course, it's an issue not just in the
United States but really worldwide, where companies and other
company -- countries are engaging in precisely the same type of
development. So my point is simply the more modest one, that
when it comes to a transformational technological tool like
generative AI, the Court should be cautious about imposing
liability.

And it really is a matter, I think, ultimately for

Congress in the first instance if it wants to extend protection beyond the protection for expression that copyright law currently provides.

When you get into these issues such as protection of style and the like, as the Court will be aware, in some contexts, there is a broader right of publicity as a matter of state law. There are broader protections. And it may very well be that, as a matter of policy, we might, as a country, want to go there.

THE COURT: And it certainly would be very easy for Congress to amend the Copyright Act to say, you know, if you -- if you are -- if you are training your product with copyrighted material and that product is going to have the ability to produce -- mass-produce similar material, you need to pay a royalty for it, or you need to -- you need to get a license to do it.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Right.

And I think that any case like this, where there is no suggestion that our tool is producing substantially similar works -- you know, there's agreement on that. Their expert Lopes agreed to that.

And where there is no evidence of a diminution in the market for plaintiffs' works as a result of the sort of output that we were discussing at the beginning of this argument, I think that the Court can write a cautious opinion that focuses

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on the record in this case and that leaves open questions about
what might take place in the future if these tools produce
outputs other than the outputs that are currently before the
Court.
     And this is an area in which the technology is rapidly
evolving. And so, you know, I think that, from our
perspective, that is a reason to focus on the four corners of
the record here and not to indulge in significant speculation
about what these tools could produce. And I think all of us
can't resist the -- the temptation to go to these tools and
prompt these tools to produce things.
     This morning, I went in my office to one of these AI tools
and tried to produce the New Yorker-style article on domestic
violence and was unable to do so, but I think that just
illustrates --
         THE COURT: For the record, I have not tried to
produce anything on any of these AI tools --
         MR. SHANMUGAM:
                         Well --
                          (Laughter.)
         THE COURT:
                    -- but maybe I'll -- maybe I will.
don't know, but I haven't -- I haven't yet.
                        Well, you can always ask the AI tools
         MR. SHANMUGAM:
to produce a song about Judge Chhabria in the style of
Taylor Swift, if you so choose.
         THE COURT:
                     Right.
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I'm now going to do that. 1 (Laughter.) 2 MR. SHANMUGAM: I think that -- I think that's all we 3 have in terms of our affirmative arguments unless you have any 4 5 other questions. 6 THE COURT: And your -- your -- your concluding 7 remarks did trigger one more question in me, and then we'll maybe take a little break since the court reporter has been 8 going for a while. 9 But you -- you wrote this down. You said, "There's no 10 11 evidence we're producing substantially similar works," and you -- and I want to -- I want to ask you a question about 12 the phrase "substantially similar" for a moment. 13 My understanding of the phrase -- the importance of the 14 15 phrase "substantially similar" is when you are deciding whether 16 somebody committed copyright infringement -- right? -- like 17

we -- usually, there's going to be no -- so outside the fair use context -- right? -- we say -- I mean, I had a -- I had a case involving Disney --

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah.

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THE COURT: -- and the Frozen movie -- right? -and -- and there was this animated short that someone created involving a snowman and a deer struggling for a carrot on a frozen pond, and then there -- you know, there -- Disney produced a trailer for Frozen, which had Olaf and the moose.

Does anybody remember the moose's name? 1 AUDIENCE MEMBER: 2 Sven. THE COURT: Sven. 3 Olaf and Sven, you know, struggling for a carrot on a 4 5 frozen pond. And there was no direct evidence that anybody at Disney copied her thing; right? But the inquiry is, is it --6 7 is it substantially similar such that you can create -- that you can -- you can draw an inference of copying? Right? 8 You used the phrase "substantially similar" in the context 9 of Factor 4; right? "There's no evidence that we're producing 10 11 substantially similar works." And my question to you is: it have to be substantially similar to affect the market for 12 Right? Is it -- I don't know if you were using it 13 the works? in the colloquial sense --14 15 MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah. 16 THE COURT: -- or in the legal sense. MR. SHANMUGAM: I think I was, but I think -- here's 17 what I would say more generally about the state of the record, 18 19 and then we can talk about how this maps onto the law. So there's no claim in this case based on the outputs, and 20 so the questioning of the expert really focused on the issue of 21 22 actual reproduction of meaningful portions of plaintiffs' 23 books, and that's the Lopes testimony that I referred to. believe it's Exhibits 23, 24, and 56 of Mr. Ghajar's 24

declaration, where Lopes says, in answer to the question,

"You're not offering any opinion that Llama is able to reproduce any significant percentage of these books; correct?"

"Answer: Correct."

Now, I don't think that there was any claim in the case that Llama could produce works that were substantially similar in this sort of infringement way, either.

THE COURT: In the -- right.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah.

THE COURT: And -- nor, I think -- I mean, I think the problem for the plaintiffs may also be that, you know, there was no evidence that Llama can produce works that are substantially similar in the infringement sense, in the legal technical infringement sense, but also maybe no evidence, or not enough evidence, that Llama will ultimately be able to, if it can't already, produce works that are similar enough, in the colloquial sense, to obliterate the market for the -- the copyrighted works.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah.

And I guess what I would say is that, in terms of the way that you've just formulated a potential Factor 4 test, I think the right way to think about the Factor 4 test is that it turns not so much on that question of similarity of expression, as it does on the transformative nature of the use, because that's what defines what is a relevant market substitute.

So, in other words --

THE COURT: Then what's the point of having Factor 4?

I mean, are you saying Factor 4 is only relevant when the use is not transformative?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well, I'm saying that when you've got a transformative use, you know -- and I would circle back to the language that I quoted earlier from <code>HathiTrust</code>: "Any economic harm caused by transformative uses does not count because such uses do not serve as substitutes for the original work."

And so, again, when you're talking about what constitutes a substitute, the mere fact that something could be a rival product, for instance, is not enough. And that's where I would circle back to cases like *Connectix*, *Accolade*, and the like.

And, again, you know, I think, in some sense, I would point to *Google Books* in this regard because you could describe -- if you took an expansive view of Factor 4, you could say that *Google Books* was a substitute because some people who go to Google Books would end up not buying the underlying books because they would find what they need, and that is not enough.

And so, yes, there is a sense in which Factor 4 is the flip side of Factor 1. The Supreme Court itself has recognized that, and I would submit that the reason why that is true is to avoid going all the way to the circularity problem, that if you said that there is a market or a potential market for the

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product that is the transformative use, you would always
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     satisfy Factor 4. And I think that that's how courts have
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     squared the circle in that regard.
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          And, again, the best evidence of that, Your Honor, is the
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     absence of any cases that find no fair use in the face of a
     determination, at least a clear determination, of transform- --
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              THE COURT: Well, I think the main answer to that is
 7
     probably that, you know, there's never been a case like this.
 8
          But, anyway, why don't we -- why don't we take a break.
 9
     We've been going for a while now. Why don't we resume at
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11
     11:20, and I'll -- I'll turn to the plaintiffs --
12
              MR. SHANMUGAM: Great.
              THE COURT: -- unless I think of any other questions
13
     that I forgot to ask you.
14
15
              MR. SHANMUGAM:
                              Great.
16
          Thank you.
17
              THE CLERK:
                          Court is in recess.
                       (Recess taken at 11:14 a.m.)
18
                   (Proceedings resumed at 11:23 a.m.)
19
              THE CLERK:
                          Please remain seated. Please come to
20
21
     order.
                          Okay. Mr. Boies?
22
              THE COURT:
                          Thank you, Your Honor.
23
              MR. BOIES:
                          Can you -- you know, you heard the
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              THE COURT:
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     concerns I have about this issue generally and, you know, the
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concerns that I have about the record in this case.
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          So could -- could you start off by addressing that?
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              MR. BOIES:
                          Sure.
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          Let me begin by addressing the record. First, there's no
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     doubt that Meta, not the plaintiffs but Meta, bears the burden
     of proof with respect to fair use. So if it is the case -- if
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     there is nothing in the record about some of these subjects,
     that dooms the fair use argument.
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                         Well, I mean, I quess part of it might
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              THE COURT:
     depend on what is part of the case -- right? -- whether you've
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11
     made it part of the case. If you haven't made it part of the
     case, if -- you know, in the complaint and in your --
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13
              MR. BOIES:
                          Sure.
                         -- you know, contention interrogatory
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              THE COURT:
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     responses and all of that kind of stuff, if you have not
16
     alleged as the basis for, you know, winning on Factor 4, the
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     kind of stuff that I'm talking about now, then I don't know if
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     they have any obligation to put forth any evidence on that
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     issue.
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                         I would agree with the Court that --
              MR. BOIES:
              THE COURT:
21
                          Okay.
22
                         -- if we've not raised the issue, they
              MR. BOIES:
     don't have to --
23
24
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
              MR. BOIES: -- deal with the issue, but I think we've
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clearly raised the issue. Indeed, Counsel, in his argument,
 1
 2
     says --
              THE COURT: All right. So where -- where have you
 3
     raised the issue? Is it -- is it in the complaint anywhere?
 4
 5
     Is it --
 6
              MR. BOIES:
                          It is in the complaint.
 7
              THE COURT:
                          Do you want to show me where -- where it
     is in the complaint?
 8
              MR. BOIES:
                          If I -- if my memory is right, it would be
 9
     98 -- Paragraphs 98, 99 --
10
11
              THE COURT:
                         Okay. Let me go --
                         -- something like that, but let me -- let
12
              MR. BOIES:
13
    me just check --
14
              THE COURT: Let me go there, too.
15
                         -- see whether -- is that the complaint?
              MR. BOIES:
16
              THE COURT:
                          No.
                               It's not those paragraphs.
17
              MR. BOIES:
                          The -- well, in 98, it talks about the
18
     downloading of the --
19
              THE COURT: Yeah.
20
          That's not what I'm talking about, though. I'm talking
21
     about the outputs having an effect on the market for the
22
    plaintiffs' works.
              MR. BOIES: Well, that -- that is certainly in our
23
     expert report, and let me just take -- be sure it's Exhibit 76.
24
25
                          It is, but Exhibit 76 is an -- is an
              THE COURT:
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exhibit of an economist; right? So it's a report of an
 1
     economist, and the economist explains how, if the -- if the
 2
     relevant market -- if the genre is flooded with, you know,
 3
     cheap imitations --
 4
 5
              MR. BOIES:
                         Right.
              THE COURT:
                         -- produced by AI models --
 6
 7
              MR. BOIES:
                          Right.
                         -- that will have the following economic
              THE COURT:
 8
     effect on the plaintiffs' works; right? And I -- that is --
 9
10
     that all makes sense to me.
11
          But the part that I think the economist doesn't cover is
     what's the likelihood that this is going to happen as a result
12
     of copyrighted works being used to train the models, how soon
13
     is it going to happen, what's going to be the magnitude of it,
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15
     all of that kind of stuff.
          In -- in other words, an AI expert who can explain how,
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     you know, the -- these models are on a -- you know, barreling
17
18
     irrevocably down a path that will result in the production of
19
     countless cheap imitations of copyrighted works that will
20
     diminish the market for the copyrighted works.
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                          I think I would -- would say two things.
              MR. BOIES:
          First, whether or not the economist makes a good case or
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23
     not, I think that clearly indicates that we have put the issue
     in the case.
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Second, I would say I think the economist does go a little

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further than that. For example, to the extent that there is
some evidence of the sharp decline in the use of people who are
writing articles on a freelance basis, he -- he shows that
correlating very sharply with open A- -- open AI.
     So if you look at the whole set from, like, the high 90 --
190s to 230, I think there is -- I think there's more in --
         THE COURT: You're saying the -- the paragraphs of
Exhibit 180 -- of Exhibit 76?
         MR. BOIES:
                     Yes.
         THE COURT:
                     Yeah.
         MR. BOIES:
                    And so I think we've clearly put that at
      They responded to that in -- in their argument. So I
think that's -- I think that is -- is at issue. I also think
the record --
                     Is there -- is there anything else in the
         THE COURT:
record that you would be able to point to to show that you put
that in issue for -- with respect to Factor 4? Because in your
papers --
         MR. BOIES:
                     Right.
         THE COURT:
                     Right.
     -- you talk -- all you -- all you focus on is the market
for providing licenses for the downloading of this -- of these
       And I -- if I remember your papers correctly, you --
you know, they said something about how the plaintiffs haven't
put any evidence in of, you know, substantially similar works
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being produced by Llama.

And your response was, "Well, that's beside the point because we're talking about this market for" -- "for licenses."

MR. BOIES: Well, I think --

THE COURT: And so, putting aside for a moment the market about -- market for licenses, I'm just wondering if you could -- it seemed like, in your papers, just from reading your briefs, that you were like this stuff that I was talking to Mr. Shanmugam about for the last hour and ten minutes doesn't actually matter; right?

And so I'm -- I'm -- I'm wondering if there's anything else that you could point to in the record, whether it's the complaint or interrogatory responses or anything else, that indicates that you thought that it did matter and that you were putting it in issue in this case.

MR. BOIES: I would -- I would say, among other things, our whole discussion of the style is related to this issue.

THE COURT: The whole discussion of the style?

MR. BOIES: In other words, we have, in our papers -- and they respond to it by saying style is not a protected element.

That's not our point. Our point is not that style is a protected element. It is that the fact that it can replicate the style means that it is competing with our works so that the

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style point goes not to whether we are claiming that copying
 1
     style is a copyright violation.
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          What we are alleging is that the copying of the style
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     shows that this work is competitive with the work that we --
 4
 5
     that we have.
 6
              THE COURT: And where is that? Can you show me where
              I apologize. It's just -- you know, there have
 7
     that is?
     been -- I've -- there has been so much to read --
 8
              MR. BOIES:
 9
                          Right.
                         -- in this -- in this case.
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              THE COURT:
                                                        I --
11
              MR. BOIES:
                         I will -- I will find that part of the
     exhibit.
12
          And -- and, for example, Mr. Farnsworth, who's here,
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     testified at his deposition that he had gone to the Meta AI and
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     asked it to write something in his style, and it did write
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     something in his style. I believe that Ms. Silverman also did
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     the same thing.
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          Again, the reason that this is relevant is it shows that
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     the model is copying our creativity, and --
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              THE COURT:
                         Right.
              MR. BOIES:
                         -- they're using that --
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22
              THE COURT: Right, but in terms of what -- how that is
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     ultimately going to affect the market -- I mean, I'll --
     I'11 --
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25
              MR. BOIES:
                          Sure.
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THE COURT: I -- I'm -- I have no doubt that you could -- you know, that I could go on there and ask, you know, the AI to write an opinion in the style of Judge Kozinski or whatever; right? But -- well, I shouldn't say I have no doubt, but I assume that I could do that.

But the -- the question I'm asking is a different one, which is, you know, have you put in issue the effect of -- you know, have you put in issue the question of how likely is it that these models will start producing, you know, similar competing works, and what effect will that have on the protected works? That's really the question.

And then I'll add one more question before I forget, which is related, which is wouldn't you also need to make some sort of presentation on the difference between the effect on the market without using copyrighted works to train the model versus the effect on the market with using copyrighted works to train the model?

Because, you know, there -- there's -- AI is happening.

Nobody's stopping AI. Whether they can use copyrighted works or not, AI is happening. And AI is going to be able to produce works in the genre of, you know, the plaintiffs' works.

And so it seems to me the real question is how much of a difference is it going to make in terms of the effect on the market if they're able to do AI with -- if they're able to include in their models copyrighted works that are downloaded

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without permission?
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              MR. BOIES: I think that the record may not be as
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     robust as either of us would like, but I think there is a lot
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     in the record about the importance to Meta of having
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     long-length books --
                          Definitely --
 6
              THE COURT:
                          -- and --
 7
              MR. BOIES:
                         -- but I'm not sure -- I'm not sure that
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              THE COURT:
     that speaks to the question that I'm asking, which is what's in
 9
10
     there about the effect on the market --
                         Well, in terms of --
11
              MR. BOIES:
                         -- for -- for plaintiffs' works?
12
              THE COURT:
                         In terms of running the model, with and
13
              MR. BOIES:
14
     without, we don't have the capacity to do that.
15
          Okay.
                 And --
              THE COURT: But what you're -- what you're saying -- I
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17
     think I understand what you're saying now. You're saying that,
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     based on the evidence that is in the record, we can assume that
19
     the model is going to do -- or it's reasonable to infer that
20
     the model will do a significantly better job at producing works
21
     in a particular genre by virtue of having been trained on
22
     copyrighted works.
23
              MR. BOIES:
                          Yes.
24
              THE COURT:
                         I get that.
25
              MR. BOIES:
                          Yes.
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And, for example, the way we approached -- I mean, for 1 example, in Paragraph 9 of -- of the complaint --2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 -- we talk about them using the 4 MR. BOIES: 5 copyrighted books to enable their AI model to mimic the copyrighted works. And in our expert report, what we say is 6 that if they mimic these -- they will be able to substitute for 7 That will affect the market. them. 8 Now, how much it will affect the market, I don't think we 9 have the capacity. That is within Meta's capacity to do. We 10 11 don't have the capacity to take their models and run them. The -- and that is one of the reasons why I think the burden is 12 properly on the alleged infringer. 13 14 THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, that's why I'm -- it's a good point, and it's --15 16 it's -- I quess that's why I'm asking whether you've -- you've put this in issue, you know, in the case. 17 And maybe -- maybe the answer is it doesn't matter, and 18 it's still their burden, but it would seem weird -- I mean, if 19 you -- you know, like, let's just say hypothetically they --20 they submitted an interrogatory -- a contention interrogatory 21 to you, and they said, "State all" -- you know, "Just state all 22 23 facts to support your contention that you win on Factor 4." And you include all this stuff about the licenses, the 24 market for license- -- licensing, but you didn't include 25

anything that Mr. Shanmugam and I were discussing this morning. 1 Uh-huh. 2 MR. BOIES: It -- under those circumstances, it seems THE COURT: 3 like it would -- it doesn't seem right to say that summary 4 5 judgment should be denied to them because they didn't put in any -- they didn't put in evidence to -- to prove a negative. 6 MR. BOIES: Well, first, I think we -- we did put it 7 at issue. And I think once we put it at issue, they do have 8 the burden of proof, but --9 THE COURT: But that's why I'm asking. Like, how did 10 11 you put it -- can you show me how you put it in issue? MR. BOIES: Well, I think when we say that they mimic 12 it, when we say that they copy our style, when they say -- when 13 we say, in our -- our economist declaration, that this is going 14 15 to adversely affect the market for our work -- I think the 16 title of that is -- I think -- I think the title of these 17 sections is --18 THE COURT: You're saying the section of Exhibit 76? MR. BOIES: Court -- Exhibit 76. 19 The paragraphs start, I think, at 192 and go to 230. And 20 I think the title of that is something that -- what Meta is 21 doing will, quote, "allow creation of works that compete with 22 23 plaintiffs' works, " which I think is exactly the point that the Court is making. 24 25 **THE COURT:** Right, but that's an economist.

I mean, it -- I guess it -- the two things about that statement are, one, it will allow it -- I -- I agree. You know, it seems likely that it will allow it, but I don't know for sure because I don't know what sort of mitigations have been put in place to -- you know, to protect against that beyond actually creating, you know, actual regurgitation.

But even assuming that the use of copyrighted material to train the -- the model will allow the model to create works that compete with the plaintiffs' works, there's a question of, like, to what magnitude, to what extent. I've been assuming, you know, based on, you know, my own sort of activities as a citizen --

MR. BOIES: Hmm.

THE COURT: -- you know, reading the newspaper and stuff like that -- I've been assuming that it will -- you know, that these models will be capable of producing competing works en masse to the point that it -- that it will obliterate the market for certain copyrighted works, maybe not all -- not all copyrighted works, probably not Sarah Silverman's work -- we'll get to that in a minute -- but -- but a lot of copyrighted works.

But -- but I -- I think, to rule in your favor, like, I need -- I need you to show that you've made that an issue in the case --

MR. BOIES: Well --

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have not.

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-- and that you've made some sort of
         THE COURT:
presentation on it, I think. I mean, I am struggling with the
burden issue; right? But -- but I just -- if you -- anyway, I
think I've -- I think --
         MR. BOIES:
                   I think I understand --
         THE COURT:
                    Yeah.
                    -- what -- what the Court is saying, and
         MR. BOIES:
what I would say to -- what I would say to the Court is -- is
three things.
     First, I think that we have put it in issue, and it may be
that, at trial, we ought to have more evidence than we've put
in at summary judgment. But at summary judgment, we've put it
at issue, and that has clearly put the burden on them. We --
we talk explicitly in the expert report about them creating --
Meta creating works that compete with our works.
     We have said in the complaint, and we've said in the
testimony in the record -- Mr. Farnsworth, Ms. Silverman, and
others -- that they mimic the work -- their work, that they
produce work in their style. I don't think you need more
testimony than that to say that's going to be competitive with
the work that our authors have produced originally.
     So I think that the -- the record is pretty clear that we
have put it at issue, we've put in evidence about it, and they
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And the second -- the second thing I would say is that,

even if we had not put in evidence here, once we've raised it, 1 they -- they cannot say, "We didn't know that" -- "we didn't 2 know it was in issue." And, indeed, I think if you look at 3 their -- their papers, they know that that is an issue. 4 5 The third thing that I would say is that, even if we had not put it in issue, they have the burden of proving fair use, 6 and I think that one of the aspects of fair use is to deal with 7 Factor 4; that is, I think they have an obligation, even if we 8 had not put it in issue, because they have the burden on fair 9 10 They have the burden of going through Factor 4 -use. 11 Factors 1 through 4, indeed, and making the case on that, which -- which they have not done. 12 And I think that the -- the stuff that was cited in 13 Counsel's argument about what they have in some of their expert 14 15 reports are, as we've put in our briefs, disputed. 16 disputes even -- even with respect to requrgitation and 17 memorization. Those -- those are disputed factual issues. I mean, they're disputed in the sense that THE COURT: 18 19 you dispute them, but I don't know if you've put in any 20 evidence of requrgitation. MR. BOIES: I think -- I think we did, Your Honor. 21 Ι 22 think -- and I think they mentioned some of it, the Lopes 23 expert report and testimony.

And -- and, indeed, in the cross-examination of Ungar, he

talked about the extent to which you could reproduce

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significant port- -- portions, not the whole thing. And -- and our -- our expert went through and showed how you could give the model a partial quotation from our authors' work, and the model would complete it.

THE COURT: Could I -- could I ask you a question about that?

So the -- you know, the ability to regurgitate a snippet of a work, it seems to me, could be significant and could really make the difference on the fair use question; right?

And I keep going back to my newspaper example -- right? -is that if -- if a -- you know, if a -- if a -- if there's a
regurgitation of 25 percent of a news article, the heart of the
news article or whatever, then the fact that the other
75 percent is not regurgitated, it seems to me, does not matter
and does not help the defendant; right?

But if you're talking about a novel, I guess I don't understand why, like, regurgitation of a snippet of a novel would matter or the ability of the -- the model to complete a, you know, sentence if you put part of the sentence from the novel.

I mean, that might be because the model is trained -really well-trained in language, or it might be because the
model has the ability to regurgitate the remainder of the
sentence. But either way, I'm just not sure why that is
terribly important from a -- a copyright standpoint.

MR. BOIES: Well, I think it depends a little bit on the factor. I think if all it can do is regurgitate a snippet, that snippet is not going to compete with the sale of the author's book. I would agree with that.

On the other hand, the fact that it can regurgitate that snippet indicates that what they have done in that model is they have copied into the model the creativity and expression of the author and --

THE COURT: I think I agree with you on that,
but it -- but I'm not sure how it affects Factor 4, but -which I think is the most important, but I think I agree with
you on that.

I mean, if -- how is it that the copying process or the training process doesn't incorporate expressive aspects of the work if it gives the product the ability to engage in similar expression or mimic the expression that is engaged -- you know, mimicked the style or whatever? I think -- I think I agree with you about that.

Let me -- could I ask you one other question, going back to the issue of the record and whether you raised the issue of the -- you know, the effect on the market in the way that I've been discussing this morning? You made a comment to the effect of, "Well, you know, maybe the presentation has not been as robust as it should be, and maybe we'll need to put in more evidence at trial."

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I mean, didn't we have a discovery cutoff as to liability with respect to the named plaintiffs in this case? And if we did --MR. BOIES: Yes. THE COURT: -- doesn't that mean that there -- you know, there's evidence that you -- if you haven't produced the evidence already, you can't -- you can't use it at trial? MR. BOIES: Well, I don't -- I wouldn't think so; that is, I wouldn't think the summary judgment record is the only record that we have at trial. At trial, people will come and, I think, testify. And -- and, for example, they can testify about what they said at their depositions. I think Mr. Farnsworth can come and testify, as he testified at his deposition, about how he asked the model. THE COURT: Right, even if it's not in the summary judgment record. I get that, but I'm just asking about adducing additional evidence that you have not adduced and not disclosed --Well, I --MR. BOIES: -- to the other side and stuff. THE COURT: MR. BOIES: I don't think -- I mean, I don't think, in most trials, the -- the evidence is limited to what the evidence was at summary judgment. I mean, for the decision that the Court needs to make, you need to make it on the summary judgment record here.

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I -- yeah.
                                                I'm asking a
 1
              THE COURT:
                          No.
                                           No.
     different question.
 2
          I mean, usually -- maybe this is a problem with doing it
 3
     the way we -- you know, structuring this case the way we
 4
 5
     structured it. But usually, you -- you know, you have a -- you
     have a discovery cutoff on February 1st, and then you have an
 6
     expert discovery cutoff on April 1st, and then you have trial
 7
     on June 1st.
 8
          And the only material that can be used at trial was the
 9
     evidence that was adduced before the discovery cutoff --
10
11
     right? -- lists like rebuttal evidence and whatever --
                         I don't --
12
              MR. BOIES:
13
              THE COURT:
                         -- right?
                         I don't --
14
              MR. BOIES:
15
              THE COURT: You're the -- you're the -- you're the
     expert trial lawyer. So tell me what I'm missing.
16
17
              MR. BOIES: I think that trials often have more
     evidence than you have at a summary judgment -- judgment
18
19
     record.
20
              THE COURT: Yeah, but you've got to disclose the
     witness. If it's from an expert, you've got to prepare an
21
22
     expert report. You've got to make them available for
23
     deposition.
          You've got to -- you know, you've got to identify all
24
25
     documents that you're use- -- you know, assuming that you
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received a discovery request to this effect, you've got to
 1
     identify all documents that you used --
 2
              MR. BOIES:
                          Sure.
 3
                         -- to support various contentions.
 4
              THE COURT:
 5
              MR. BOIES:
                         And we can do that, but --
 6
              THE COURT: So what do you have? What have you -- and
     you have to do that before the discovery cutoff; right?
 7
                          No. No, not usually. I mean, usually --
 8
              MR. BOIES:
     usually, you don't do your exhibits or your witnesses before
 9
     the discovery cutoff. I mean, you may -- if you name a new
10
11
     witness that has not been -- take his deposition, sometimes
    people get a chance --
12
              THE COURT: Or has not been disclosed.
13
              MR. BOIES: Or -- or -- well -- but you don't even
14
15
     disclose. What you do -- under Rule 26, you will disclose
16
    people with knowledge, but you will continue to update that --
              THE COURT:
17
                         Right --
              MR. BOIES:
                         -- throughout the --
18
                         -- but if you haven't disclosed that
19
              THE COURT:
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     person as somebody with knowledge, and then you, you know --
21
              MR. BOIES:
                         Right.
              THE COURT: -- in the pretrial conference, you list
22
23
     them as a witness, that witness will probably be excluded --
     right? -- unless you have --
24
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              MR. BOIES: Unless you have a reason for why you
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didn't list them before.
 1
                                 Right. That's what I'm saying.
 2
              THE COURT:
                          Yeah.
          So I quess what I'm saying is, like, putting aside whether
 3
     you put this in issue, what evidence do you have now? Like,
 4
 5
     what evidence have you adduced up to this point that -- that
     the -- the markets for the plaintiffs' protected works will be
 6
     dramatically impacted by the proliferation of, you know,
 7
     competing works produced by Llama?
 8
              MR. BOIES: Well, I think that it would be, in part,
 9
     our expert testimony that says, "Yes, Llama can produce works
10
11
     that compete with the works of our authors in the style of our
     authors, that that will adversely affect their work." That is
12
     a matter of economic theory that I think --
13
                          Well -- but let me -- so -- so let me ask
14
              THE COURT:
15
     you about that. I mean, let's take Sarah Silverman, for
16
     example --
17
              MR. BOIES:
                          Right.
18
              THE COURT:
                          -- right?
          Her -- if I recall, her book was -- it's a memoir, and
19
     it's a series of, like, ten essays or something like that;
20
     right? And it's funny, and it's about her, and she's a pub- --
21
     you know, a famous person.
22
          Like, how is the proliferation of material from Llama
23
     going to affect the market for her memoir?
24
                          Well, if --
25
              MR. BOIES:
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What evidence is -- and is there any
         THE COURT:
evidence that the prolif- -- proliferation of material from
Llama will affect the market for her -- for her memoir?
         MR. BOIES: Well, I think that, to the extent that it
is able to mimic her work, it will affect the market for her
work in different ways. One way that it will affect it is that
some people will read her book to learn about her. Some people
will read that book for the jokes, for the --
         THE COURT: Because Sarah Silverman -- because they
know that Sarah Silverman is funny.
         MR. BOIES: Because they know that Sarah Silverman is
funny and because it is funny, and if you have a -- and her
particular style, for some people, is very funny.
    And so if you have a mimicked book in the style and jokes
of Sarah Silverman, that, for some people, is going to diminish
their interest in buying her book, and particularly --
         THE COURT:
                    And where is the evidence -- where is the
evidence of that?
                    Well, I would suggest that if it is
         MR. BOIES:
limited --
                     That seems like a -- you know, again,
         THE COURT:
talking about the different types of works that could be
copied.
         MR. BOIES:
                     Yes.
                     I mean, it seems like her work is
         THE COURT:
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probably, like, the least likely -- the market for her work is about the least likely to be affected of anybody's work, like her and, you know -- and somebody who's famous and is writing about themselves and, you know, is telling a story about their life.

I mean, I, you know -- so where -- what evidence have you adduced thus far in the case, whether it's in the summary judgment record or not?

I mean, it seems like you're asking me to speculate that the market for Sarah Silverman's memoir will -- will be affected by the -- you know, the billions of things that Llama will ultimately be capable of producing, and it's just not obvious to me that that's the case.

MR. BOIES: Right.

I think that if you have a copy, a mimic, something that is able to reproduce in the style of the original, I think, as a matter of economics, that is going to compete with the original. I think an economist -- our economist has said that. I think an econ- -- I think an economist is entitled to say that.

I think we have in the record --

THE COURT: What about Barack Obama's autobiography?

MR. BOIES: I think there are a lot of people who read

Barack Obama's biography just because they want to hear it from

Barack Obama.

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And I think that in a situation like that, really unique,
you know -- maybe not unique, but a very unusual person in our
history -- I think that those -- those kind of people will want
to substitute -- they will want to hear what he says.
     Now, I think the closer they mimic, I think, and
particularly if it's -- if it's very cheap or free, compared to
paying $26 or $46 for the book, that may affect some of the
market.
                    So you think -- you think Barack Obama's
         THE COURT:
book sales will be -- we can just assume, as a matter of
economics, that Barack Obama's book sales will be affected by
AI?
         MR. BOIES:
                     I think virtually every -- virtually every
economist would say that, although the degree, I think, will
vary, and I think the degree will vary significantly.
         THE COURT: Well, doesn't that matter for purposes of
the fair use inquiry? Because, you know, you are -- you're
balancing -- I mean, the -- the Google Books case is an
example; right?
     The -- the Pierre Leval case, the Second Circuit case --
         MR. BOIES:
                     Right.
                     I can't remember the name of it, but it --
         THE COURT:
you know, yes, the market for the plaintiffs' work was
diminished to a degree, but the transformative use was
substantial.
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And so there was -- there was fair use in that case.
mean, if Barack Obama filed a lawsuit -- right? -- the fair use
outcome, it seems to me, could be different -- right? -- from
the outcome of a lawsuit filed by, you know, a magazine
publisher, you know, the -- what's the -- what's the
magazine --
                     The Atlantic --
         MR. BOIES:
                          I was going to say, like, a gun
         THE COURT:
                     No.
magazine --
         MR. BOIES:
                     Oh.
         THE COURT:
                     -- right?
         MR. BOIES:
                     Right.
         THE COURT:
                     I mean, a magazine -- the qun magazine.
If the -- all of a sudden, there were a bunch of magazine
articles about guns -- Gun & Rifle? Is that what it was
called?
     Anyway, the -- the -- you know, if, all of a sudden, there
are a bunch of similar magazine articles about guns, it's going
to dramatically affect the market for -- for that magazine, but
it's barely going to affect, if at all, the market for Obama's
autobiography.
     And so -- and the problem -- one problem, I think, is you
haven't put in anything about how the market would be affected
for different types of authors, different types of artists,
different types of producers; right?
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Well, I would -- I would suggest first MR. BOIES: that the plaintiffs that you have in front of you, the 13 plaintiffs you have in front of you, are not Barack Obamas. THE COURT: Yeah, but what about -- that's why I asked about Sarah Silverman. I mean, it's -- it's not obvious to me at all. I mean, it seems like you're -- you're saying that I can sort of take on faith, as a matter of economics, that Sarah Silverman -- the market for Sarah Silverman's memoir will be affected by Llama's outputs, and I just don't know --MR. BOIES: Well --I don't -- I don't know -- there's nothing THE COURT: I can look to in the summary judgment record to tell me that that's so. Well, I think that -- two things. MR. BOIES: One, I don't want to lose --Or that -- or that that competition in the THE COURT: market -- you know, that the market for her work would be affected in anything more than a de minimus way. Well, first of all, I don't want to lose MR. BOIES: track of who has the burden here -- okay? -- because we've put this issue. And whether you agree or not, whether a jury would agree or not, that's not the issue here, I think. The second thing is that how much the market is going to

be affected is, as I thought you put very well in your 12th

question -- I think it was your 12th question -- is related to how valuable it is to copy the copyrighted work.

We're not talking about do we have AI or not. We're going to have AI. What we're talking about is, in the language of the cases, is it reasonably necessary in order for them to have AI for them to copy Sarah Silverman's work or Mr. Kadrey's work?

THE COURT: Well, not -- not is it reasonably necessary for them to have AI. I think the question would be, you know, is the improvement in the creativity as a result of using copyrighted works to train the model so great that it justifies whatever diminishment of the market it would be caused for the -- for the owners of the copyrighted works?

MR. BOIES: And --

THE COURT: Do you agree with that?

MR. BOIES: I do, Your Honor.

And -- and now you look at the record, and you see nothing that would bear Meta's burden on that issue. And -- and if we have the burden, you might be arguing do we have enough. I actually think we do have enough in the record, even -- even if we had the burden, but we don't have the burden.

THE COURT: Right, but you -- I mean, the thing that's so procedurally odd about this situation is that you also moved for summary judgment on fair use. And you -- you moved for summary judgment on fair use, in part, because you contended

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that you win the fourth factor. And -- but you didn't put in
 1
     anything, and you didn't rely on anything related to the stuff
 2
     we're discussing today.
 3
          I mean, you had -- yes, you have that -- those paragraphs
 4
 5
     from that report from that economist, Exhibit 67.
                                                        I mean,
     that's it; right? And you didn't argue it in your motion, and
 6
     you didn't -- you know, you focused on the market -- you know,
 7
     the market for licenses.
 8
          And so it's -- it's just so -- I've twisted myself into a
 9
     pretzel trying to conceptualize this because you're right that
10
11
     they have the burden on fair use, but you moved for summary
     judgment on fair use. You put in the materials that you felt
12
     could get you summary judgment on fair use.
13
          And you barely put anything in on this issue that we've
14
15
     been spending all this time talking about, and then you're
16
     saying, "They can't have summary judgment because they didn't
17
     put anything in on this issue that we didn't raise in our
18
     summary judgment motion."
          Its a -- it's a -- it's a head-spinner for me.
19
20
     I'm not --
21
              MR. BOIES:
                         Okay.
22
                          I'm having a hard time figuring out how
              THE COURT:
     to -- how to deal with it.
23
                          I think that -- we did not move for
24
              MR. BOIES:
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summary judgment on the whole case. We moved for summary

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judgment on only those copies that they made when they were
 1
     downloading from the pirate websites. The -- the -- to the
 2
     extent that fair use --
 3
              THE COURT: I thought you moved for summary judgment
 4
 5
     on all -- on all acts of training the model on copyrighted
            Did I -- did I misunderstand that?
 6
     works.
              MR. BOIES: I -- I think so, but -- but if you did, we
 7
     obviously weren't clear enough.
 8
              THE COURT:
 9
                          No.
              MR. BOIES:
                         The --
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11
              THE COURT:
                         I misunderstand things all the time.
              MR. BOIES: The -- but what we were moving for summary
12
13
     judgment on was the initial copy. There were numerous copies
     made along the way. We were -- we were moving for summary
14
15
     judgment just on that initial copy that they made downloading
16
     it from the pirate websites, the copy that we know was made
     from something that was illegal.
17
                          Could I interrupt you for a second and
18
              THE COURT:
19
     just read to you --
20
              MR. BOIES:
                          Sure.
21
                         -- from your notice of the motion?
              THE COURT:
22
              MR. BOIES:
                         Yeah.
                          So just pull it up, and it's on Page 1,
23
              THE COURT:
     and it says, "Take notice that we are moving for summary
24
25
     judgment" -- no. No. Sorry. I'm looking at theirs.
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Let me look at yours.
 1
          Hold on.
 2
                                (Laughter.)
                          Let me --
              MR. BOIES:
 3
                          I was about to say, "Yes, you did move
 4
              THE COURT:
 5
     completely on fair use."
              MR. BOIES: Well, if we moved completely on fair use,
 6
     we didn't support it, Your Honor, in terms of --
 7
              THE COURT: Yeah.
 8
          Hold on. Let me just -- let me just look at it.
 9
          I mean, you say Meta's reproduction of plaintiffs'
10
11
     copyrighted books without permission, including through
     peer-to-peer file sharing, is not fair use.
12
          I -- I took it to mean that you were filing a motion for
13
     partial summary judgment. You weren't seeking summary judgment
14
15
     on the distribute- -- the claim that you have for distribution,
16
     but you were moving for summary judgment on your copyright
     infringement claim based on copying.
17
18
          That's how -- that's how I took it. That's where -- how
19
     it reads to me.
20
                          And -- and you may very well be correct,
              MR. BOIES:
     Your Honor. I think the -- the thrust of the motion that we
21
     made was to deal with the downloading, the torrenting, and the
22
23
     like.
              THE COURT: You certainly focused heavily on that,
24
25
     yes.
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MR. BOIES: The -- and if I can limit it to this point, what I would say is what we're moving for summary judgment on is that downloading from the illegal websites, which we don't think raises any fair use issue.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BOIES: And -- and -- and, indeed, you know, one of your, you know, questions was, you know, about how we say when you download, it's dispositive. They say it's irrelevant, and maybe the answer is somewhere in between.

But what we were -- with respect to the initial downloading -- okay? -- this was -- this was something in which they knew what they were copying from was not an authorized copy. They concealed the use of that, which we think goes to their intent and knowledge.

And they did this for reasons not just to train their AI model. They did it in order to evaluate the works, to see whether they would be valuable for the training. They used it to determine whether they needed to get licenses. The record is clear that they started out thinking they were going to get licenses.

And then they decide -- then they downloaded this, and they found they got good copies of this for free. And so then they write internally saying, "We're only going to now license the gap." By "gap," what they mean is the difference between what was on the illegal websites and what they need.

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And as late as last year, they estimate in their documents, which are in -- which is -- which are in the summary judgment record, that they're going to -- 10 to 20 percent of the text that they're going to use, they're going to get from licensing. So I think that in terms of --THE COURT: Seems kind of messed up. Yeah. Yeah. MR. BOIES: (Laughter.) But the -- the question, as the courts THE COURT: tell us over and over again, is not whether something is messed It's -- the question is whether it's copy infringement and whether it's fair use. MR. BOIES: No, but this -- this goes to copy- -whether it's copyright infringement. If they're taking illegal copies, and they know they're taking illegal copies, that goes to copyright infringement. And I -- I don't know whether this is the right time to do it or not, but I think that -- that while -- as our framing it went on this morning about the issue is -- is relevant, we can't lose sight of the fact that what Congress has said is that you can't copy works unless you can justify it under free -- under fair use.

It's not that you only look at whether they're copying

some elements or not elements. You can't copy any of those

copyrighted works. Okay? Whether they're copying expressive elements or not goes to whether it's going to be fair use under some of the cases. Those cases are -- are not at all like the kind of cases the Court has in front of you today.

Okay. These are things like search engines, where the -where the court says this is not going to affect the -- the
work. And when you look at *Google Books* and they say that
maybe somebody isn't going to buy a book because of the
snippets, first, the court -- the court says that's not
realistic.

And in addition to that, Google -- if you filled out an online form, Google wouldn't even give you the snippets. And in *HathiTrust*, we didn't even get a --

THE COURT: If the author -- if the author or the copyright holder filled out a form?

MR. BOIES: Yeah, filled out an online form, and that's in the Supreme Court decision.

And in *HathiTrust*, all we got was page numbers, which is not going to substitute for -- for reading the book. The courts talk about it as a pointer.

The other case -- the kind of cases that they cite are the computer code cases, where, as the court says in *Google* against *Oracle*, they said these are functional things. You're using these to get at the creative value.

The same thing was true with -- with Connectix that, you

know, Counsel cited. They were making those intermediate copies to get at the thing that they needed to get at to make it compatible, and they expressly did not use any of those -- any of the content of that in their final product. They created it all themselves. They reverse engineered it.

So none of those cases, I think, have anything to do with the kind of case that you're -- you're dealing with here. This is a situation in which, when they make the copy, it -- it shouldn't make any difference. Whether they think they're copying expressive elements or not-expressive elements, that's a violation of the copyright law.

Now, they do copy the expressive elements. And when we show that they can, you know, mimic it, when they show they can complete the sentence, when they show they can do it in the same style, that's not because each of -- one of those is necessarily a copyright violation, but it shows that what they have done is copy it.

And what they have done is create something that is inconsistent with a -- with a copyholder's rights.

THE COURT: I was just reminded of one other question.

I think this is the last question, although I can't promise
that.

MR. BOIES: Yes.

THE COURT: What about the -- my shadow library question? That is, you know, would a rule that said that it

was fair use for companies making AI models to download stuff 1 off of LibGen and other shadow libraries create -- would 2 bolster the market for those shad- -- those illegal shadow 3 libraries? 4 5 MR. BOIES: It would, Your Honor --THE COURT: How? 6 MR. BOIES: -- and it would -- would in several ways. 7 First of all, the way they -- the way Meta did it -- it 8 didn't have to do it this way, but -- but the way they did 9 it --10 11 THE COURT: Put aside the leeching for a second. just asking about downloading from shadow libraries; right? 12 These shadow libraries are -- they offer these copyrighted 13 works for free to download off the Internet. It's illegal for 14 15 them to do that; right? 16 And forget about -- I'm happy to talk about the leeching, 17 but put -- put aside the leeching for a second. 18 MR. BOIES: Yes. Okay. Sure. And I'm just saying the -- but if we had a 19 THE COURT: 20 rule, a copyright rule, that said that it's okay for companies 21 that create AI models to download works from shadow libraries, would that bolster the market, strengthen the market of shadow 22 23 libraries? Should -- would that strengthen the position of shadow libraries? Would it give strength to these illegal 24 shadow libraries? 25

And -- and you say yes, and I want to -- I want to 1 understand how. 2 MR. BOIES: Sure. 3 Well, first, if Meta is going to do it, there's going to 4 5 be increased pressure on all the competitors to do it. THE COURT: Sure. 6 7 MR. BOIES: And so --And then do we know -- speaking of THE COURT: 8 competitors, I mean, do we know how many people there are out 9 10 there in the world, how many companies there are out there in 11 the world, you know, who might use shadow libraries to download copyrighted works to -- to train their models? 12 I don't think we know. I think what the 13 MR. BOIES: record does show is that there are a number of them, and they 14 15 are growing all the time, and that they are both people like 16 open AI and Meta who are doing very large models designed to do 17 many, many things. And then there are also people that are 18 doing much more discrete AI models. But I think what we do know is that there are a number of 19 them now, and they're growing, and there are going to be a lot 20 21 of them in the future. And if -- if the rule is take whatever 22 you want from the shadow library:

A. If you have that rule, then a lot of people are going to do it;

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B. If you have that rule for some people, then everybody

who competes with those people are going to have to do it. 1 In addition, I don't think you can --2 THE COURT: Could I -- could I ask a follow-up 3 question about that? 4 Does more people downloading stuff from shadow libraries 5 somehow strengthen the illegal shadow libraries? Do you know 6 7 anything about how they make their money or -- or anything like that? 8 MR. BOIES: Most of them do not primarily make their 9 money by charging people for doing this. Most of them have 10 11 other ulterior purposes for -- for doing it. There are --Like ideological purposes or what? 12 THE COURT: MR. BOIES: 13 What? Ideological purposes? 14 THE COURT: Ideological purposes or just -- just that 15 MR. BOIES: 16 information ought to be free. Like, there are people who don't 17 believe in the copyright laws, generally don't believe in it. Now, some of them do offer people accelerated priority 18 19 downloads if they pay them money, but that's not primarily --20 they're not -- they're not profit-making organizations. 21 are illegal. I mean, they -- they are -- you know, they're --So -- so how -- how would -- so if we 22 THE COURT: 23 assume that this -- you know, a rule allowing companies like Meta to download stuff off -- from shadow libraries to train 24 25 their AIA models -- AI models, if we -- we can assume that that

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will cause lots more companies to be downloading stuff from
shadow libraries to train their AI models, but how would that,
like, strengthen these illegal shadow libraries?
         MR. BOIES: Well, the -- the more people that use
them -- these are often peer-to-peer, and the more people that
use them, the more bandwidth and processing power they have.
     I know there -- I don't want to talk about the -- the
uploading right now for this purpose, but -- but most people,
when they download, upload at the same time. And when they do,
they are giving all of their bandwidth and processing power to
what is called the swarm, which is a phrase I had never heard
until this case.
    But the -- all of the nodes, the people who participate in
these things, together are called a swarm. And the more people
that are participating in the swarm, the more efficient it --
the swarm is in getting all of this copyrighted material out.
         THE COURT:
                     Okay. And that's -- but that is when
you're downloading and uploading at the same time, leeching --
         MR. BOIES:
                     Yes.
                    -- or is it also when you are -- what's
         THE COURT:
the other word?
                Seeding?
                    Well, seeding and leeching are two ways of
         MR. BOIES:
uploading.
                    Seeding is uploading after the downloading
         THE COURT:
is complete --
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MR. BOIES:
                          Yeah.
 1
                         -- and leeching is uploading
 2
              THE COURT:
     simultaneously.
 3
                          That's the way I understand it.
 4
              MR. BOIES:
 5
              THE COURT:
                          Okay. And -- and so what -- so you wanted
     to talk about the leeching.
 6
          So you -- so one point you're making about the leeching is
 7
     that if you download this, and you're -- and you're
 8
     simultaneously uploading materials, and you're making your
 9
10
     computing power available to the swarm, you're making it easier
11
     for illegal shadow libraries to disseminate the copyrighted
     works illegally?
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              MR. BOIES:
13
                          Yes.
                          Okay. What -- anything else you want to
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              THE COURT:
15
     say about the leeching issue?
16
              MR. BOIES:
                          No.
17
              THE COURT:
                         Okay. All right.
              MR. BOIES: Now -- now, in addition to the other
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     things that I just talked about, there's a reputational thing.
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     At least until companies like Meta began to do this,
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     respectable companies didn't want to be associated with these
     pirate websites.
22
          And, indeed, you see throughout Meta's documents people
23
     saying, "This" -- "this is a line we shouldn't cross. We don't
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25
     want to be associated it. There's terrible reputational
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That discourages, and has discouraged, most companies
     risks."
     from -- you know, most large, respectable companies from using
     these pirate websites.
          Once, if it happens, courts begin to rule, "Well, that's
     fair use.
               Go ahead and do it, " the reputational stigma, which
     is real, in terms -- most people generally don't want to be
     associated with criminal enterprises, and -- and even if it's
     helpful to them, they will try to avoid it.
                                                  The more
     respectability that these criminal enterprises get, the more
     people are going to use it and the less -- the less of an
11
     inhibition that will have.
          So I think the competitive part, the -- if you let Meta do
     it, Meta's competitors are going to have to do it, the
     reputational part as well as the leeching --
14
15
                         And then all this stuff -- there's -- I
              THE COURT:
16
     appreciate the tutorial on it, but none of this stuff is in the
17
     record; correct?
              MR. BOIES: None of this what?
              THE COURT:
                         None of this stuff is in the record;
19
20
     correct?
21
                         Oh, no, no.
              MR. BOIES:
                          The stuff that we're talking about?
              THE COURT:
              MR. BOIES:
                               The -- the fact about the competition
                          No.
     is in the record. In fact, one of the things -- Meta is
     saying, "We can't let other people get ahead of us."
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No, no, no. I understand that, but if --
 1
              THE COURT:
                          But by -- by "get ahead of us," I didn't
 2
              MR. BOIES:
     mean just generally. I meant in terms of using these pirated
 3
     websites.
 4
 5
              THE COURT:
                          Oh, yeah.
                                     No.
                                          I know that.
          But in terms of the effect that allowing companies to use
 6
     the shadow libraries for this purpose would have on the shadow
 7
     libraries, there's nothing in -- on the record on that, is
 8
     there?
 9
              MR. BOIES: No, there -- no, there is, Your Honor.
10
11
     mean, we covered this in expert reports and in depositions in
     terms of the bandwidth and the processing power that is --
12
              THE COURT: The processing power part is in there?
13
          Okay. All right.
14
                          The -- and, you know -- and the
15
              MR. BOIES:
16
     reputational part, you know, is in there, you know -- I mean,
17
    not the way I said it exactly, which is more of an argument
18
     based on what's in the record, but the fact that these are
19
     criminal enterprises and that people are reluctant to use them
20
     for that reason -- that's in the record.
                          Okay. All right. Anything else you want
21
              THE COURT:
     to -- you want to say before -- I'll let -- I'll let them have
22
23
     the last word.
                          There are -- there are lots of things.
24
              MR. BOIES:
25
                               (Laughter.)
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MR. BOIES: The -- but -- I mean, like, you know, for example, on the licensing thing that was -- was talked about, the -- the standard, as I know the Court knows, is not just whether there's a market effect on the traditional market. It's also whether there's a market effect on a market that's reasonable to develop or that is likely to develop in the future.

And -- and the fact that you had all these negotiations and that you still have them saying they're going to have 10 to 20 percent of what they license of -- with the use --

THE COURT: Yeah.

I just think the problem is if -- if you can't show that, you know, the proliferation of this -- of these models using copyrighted works will affect, in a significant way, the market for the copyrighted works, then I think the -- all the discussion of the market for a license or the potential market for a license is beside the point --

MR. BOIES: Well --

THE COURT: -- because I think you'd lose if you can't show that the market for the copyrighted works that are being used to train the models are dramatically impacted, not the life -- for -- not the market for a license to use the work for training AI but the market for the works themselves.

If you can't show that the market for the works themselves is dramatically impacted by using them to train AI, then I

```
think the -- the discussion of the market for a license to use
 1
     the products to train AI is beside the point because you -- you
 2
     wouldn't win in that case because you -- you know, it's -- you
 3
     would lose significant -- you would lose badly on Factor 1, and
 4
 5
     you wouldn't have done enough on Factor 4 to win.
 6
          I'd tend to agree with you. Like, I'm -- it strikes me as
 7
    pretty fanciful to argue that a license -- a market for a --
     for licensing copyrighted materials for AI training could not
 8
            I mean, I -- I'm assuming, for purposes of this
 9
     discussion, that it could.
10
11
              MR. BOIES: But if it could form, if it's original for
     it to form.
12
13
              THE COURT:
                          Yeah.
              MR. BOIES: And that is a license -- and that is a
14
15
     market that they have the copyright for. There's no doubt
16
     that --
17
                          No.
                               They don't have a copyright for -- to
              THE COURT:
     license people to use works -- their works for training AI
18
19
              That's the question in this case.
     models.
20
                                    I know that, but what I'm saying
              MR. BOIES:
                          No.
                               No.
     is they -- they have that right unless -- unless it's taken
21
22
     away by fair use.
23
                          Right.
              THE COURT:
                          So -- and --
24
              MR. BOIES:
25
              THE COURT: And I think it's only -- it's -- I
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think -- to be blunt about it, I think it is taken away by fair use unless the plaintiff can show that the market for their actual copyrighted work is going to be dramatically affected by the -- the use of copyrighted works to train the models.

MR. BOIES: Right, but --

THE COURT: I think that's the heart of this -- of the issue in this case and in all -- all of these cases.

MR. BOIES: Since the -- the right to license for use in training for any purpose is imperative to the bundle of rights that the copyright holder has, and that's a market. I don't understand why that market is any more -- is less subject to protection than the market for the original work.

The -- the copyright law clearly gives not only the right to distribute your original work but the right to license somebody to make a copy of that to do whatever they want, to make a movie, to do something transformative with it.

And what Factor 4 says is that if you are adversely affected in a significant way, the -- the copyright holder's markets, what the copyright holder has a right to do -- that that's not fair use.

And, for example --

THE COURT: But it just -- it begs the question of whether, you know -- if -- if the use is transformative, then it begs the question of whether you can make them get a license.

MR. BOIES: Well --1 THE COURT: And I -- I think, in a case like this, in 2 this context, you have to show something more than an adverse 3 4 effect on the market for licenses to train -- to use materials 5 to train AI models. I think that is circular, as the -- as the 6 other side says. 7 But if it is, it's circular both ways MR. BOIES: because what they're saying -- because what you would have to 8 say is that it's -- it's fair use because it's transformative. 9 10 And because it's fair use, you don't have to look at Factor 4 11 in terms of the licensing market. And I think if you look at Warhol, for example, in Warhol, 12 13 there was no doubt that what Andy Warhol did was transformative and --14 15 But the Supreme Court said that it wasn't. THE COURT: 16 MR. BOIES: No. No. That's the thing. The court did 17 not say it wasn't. What -- what in fact, what the court 18 implied was that --She basically said that it wasn't. 19 THE COURT: No. 20 (Laughter.) But what the -- no. What the court 21 MR. BOIES: 22 implied was it was transformative. And, in fact, the court 23 went out of its way to say, "We're not saying that what is here is not transformative for all sorts of purposes." It's simply 24

not something that can be done for purposes of selling this" --

or licensing this to a magazine for a story about Richard --1 you know -- you know, about Richard -- not Richard Prince. 2 That's a different author -- different artist -- but 3 Bob Prince. 4 5 THE COURT: Prince. MR. BOIES: The -- I think if you look at what -- what 6 the court is saying -- is that the court is saying that this is 7 not fair use for this purpose, which is the purpose of 8 marketing it to a magazine. But the court is, I think, 9 quite -- quite pointedly, saying, "We're not saying that this 10 11 is not transformative for other purposes." But they have -- that because this was having an effect on 12 the photograph's -- photographer's ability to license their 13 product for -- for a similar purpose, that's what made it not 14 15 fair use. 16 So I think that you can have something that's very --THE COURT: Yeah, but the purpose of having the 17 photograph is to license it for use. The purpose of having --18 of writing a book is to sell the book. 19 No, Your Honor. You license -- you may 20 MR. BOIES: sell the book. You may license it. You -- you license it for 21 22 all sorts of purposes. You can license it to make a movie. 23 You can license it to be used in a song. You can license it to do a -- build on a sequel. You can license it for all sorts of 24

reasons, and when you're licensing it here, you're licensing it

for its creative purpose. 1 You've got to look, I would respectfully suggest, at the 2 use of the copyrighted work, not the end product of what that 3 4 copyrighted work does. The use here is to appropriate the 5 creativity of the author. It is not like in a -- one of these computer code cases to allow somebody to connect or 6 7 compatibility. It's not like the search engine, which is just to have a pointer to point to the copyrighted work. 8 This is -- this is a situation in which they are taking 9 the creativity. They are appropriating the creativity. That 10 11 is unlike any of these other cases. **THE COURT:** Okay. I understand that now. 12 I'll go back and look at that. 13 14 MR. BOIES: Thank you. 15 Any other comment -- final comments? THE COURT: 16 MR. BOIES: No. Thank you. 17 THE COURT: No? 18 Last word? MR. SHANMUGAM: The Court has been --19 20 THE COURT: I think the -- I think the most important 21 thing to discuss -- I'm happy to hear whatever you want to say 22 in closing, but the most important thing to discuss is the record and the burden issue --23

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah.

24

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THE COURT: -- relating to Factor 4.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Sure.

And the Court's been very generous with its time. So I'll be accordingly brief.

THE COURT: That's your way of saying, "When are you going to end this hearing?"

(Laughter.)

MR. SHANMUGAM: We're all hungry, particularly those of us on East Coast time.

The one thing we didn't hear from my friend, Mr. Boies, is any real suggestion that this use is not highly transformative for purposes of Factor 1. So let me respectfully submit how we think the analysis, under Factor 4, should go here.

I think that there are really four conceivable theories of market harm that could be in play in this case. The first would be if Llama actually regurgitated expressive content such that the output from Llama was a very close substitute. And, again, as I said in my opening argument, there's no suggestion whatsoever of this in this case.

I would point to the concessions made by Lopes, their expert, at Exhibits 23 and 24 of the Ghajar --

THE COURT: I get that.

MR. SHANMUGAM: -- declaration. So that theory is off the table, but we would certainly recognize that that would be the paradigmatic cognizable theory if it were in play.

The second is the theory that you had been focusing on

today, which is whether Llama produces, or could produce, rival works that could lead to reduced sales. And I do think that that is a matter of proof, and I do think that the way that it should work here, notwithstanding the fact that we bear the ultimate burden, is whether or not this is a theory that they, in fact, pursued.

And I would invite the Court to look at the complaint and the briefing and reach a conclusion about that, but I would say that the reason why this is a matter of proof is that it turns on a number of very specific questions.

The first is the effect on the market for plaintiffs' work, and I think the cases are clear that it has to be an effect on plaintiffs' work, not the work of other hypothetical authors.

The second is that it has to focus on Llama and what Llama produces, and it's not enough to focus on other AI tools, which operate quite differently. And the third is a facet that you fastened onto, which is what would the effects be in the absence of the otherwise-infringing conduct.

And I think, with respect, that Spulber's testimony in the declaration and in his deposition falls far short of that. And these are the paragraphs that my friend, Mr. Boies, referred to, starting at, I believe, Paragraph 196 of the declaration.

And I -- those portions of the report discuss the possible effect of market harm from models made by other developers. It

relies on statements made in news reports by nonparties.

And when pressed on this at his deposition, Spulber admitted that he didn't look at any outputs from Llama, that he didn't conduct any analysis of lost sales, and that it was possible that Llama's outputs would not have a negative impact on future sales of plaintiffs' books.

And I would go further than that and note that plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that they could not identify a single example of a lost sale due to Llama, and I would point to the RFAs and what plaintiffs said in response to that.

And I would also note that our expert, Sinkinson, did conduct a regression analysis that showed that there were no lost sales from --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SHANMUGAM: -- Llama. So --

THE COURT: I mean, I want to just -- I don't want to be repeating myself too much, but I don't think that they have to show lost sales; right? They have to show the potential for, you know -- and a significant effect on -- on the market for their product.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah.

And I do think that, again, those paragraphs of Spulber's declaration, I would submit, are not sufficient to put that theory in play. And, of course, one can always speculate about that. That is one of the challenges of proof in this context.

And I think the way to reconcile our burden with the summary judgment standard here is to say that, at a minimum, they have to put those theories in play. And then, at that point, you apply the ordinary summary judgment standard, and they have simply failed to do that.

THE COURT: Can I -- I know you wanted to -MR. SHANMUGAM: Yeah.

THE COURT: You probably want to list the other theories of market harm, but just one other question about that, I think.

You know, I think you're right that the focus needs to be on Llama; right?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Yes.

THE COURT: And -- but do you deny that Llama either is capable, or soon will be capable, of mass-producing, you know, works in particular genres like the young adult fiction genre or the, you know, mystery genre or the romance genre or whatever?

I mean, isn't Llama already capable of mass-producing works in those genres?

MR. SHANMUGAM: So I don't mean to be difficult in saying what I'm about to say. I think that that is a question of proof, and I think that one of the --

THE COURT: I know. I'm just asking as a matter of common sense. I mean, can't Llama -- I mean, I bet -- I

haven't bothered to do this, but I'm guessing, if we looked at advertisement -- advertising materials for Llama, we would see that Llama is touted as being able to do that kind of stuff.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well, I think one of the real difficulties here, Judge Chhabria, is that if you decide to go down this route as a legal matter, I think there are some very difficult legal questions about what the exact contours of this rule are going to be.

In other words, how far do you go beyond substantial similarity, for lack of a better term, in saying that a market effect is going to be cognizable? And I think the easy outcome in this case is to say this issue hasn't been put into play, and the Court could write an opinion very easily that leaves those issues open for another day.

But I don't want to leave you with a sense that we don't have support for the notion that the cognizable effects are the effects that bear on the expressive component of plaintiffs' work, and I do want to leave you with just a couple of other sources that I think are elucidating in this regard.

One of them is a source cited by the Supreme Court in Campbell, at 510 U.S, at 591, which is an article written by Patry & Perlmutter, the current register of copyrights, that I think makes this exact point that I was discussing earlier about the fact that the cognizable effect is the effect on the expressive component of plaintiffs' work.

And the *Nimmer* treatise also makes this point. It makes the point that Factor 4 doesn't consider, quote, "the adverse impact on the potential market for plaintiff's work by reason of defendant having copied from it non-copyrightable factual material." That's at Section 13F.08, brackets, C, brackets, 2, and it cites the *Connectix* and *Sega* case for that proposition.

So while I recognize that this is an issue that may not have been fully fleshed out in so many terms in the case law, I think both of those sources support our view that these effects become uncognizable once you get beyond the expressive component, and I'll circle back to that in just a second. Let me just say a couple of quick things about the other theories.

I think your colloquy with Mr. Boies well-exposed why the third theory, which is the potential market for licensing for the specific use of AI training, cannot, in and of itself, be a sufficient theory if the theory about effects on sales is off the table, and that is because of the circularity problem that we've been discussing.

And I would note that that really is the primary theory that plaintiffs have advanced, and there's no better source for that than their summary judgment briefing, where they spend almost the entirety of their time on that.

I do think that there is no genuine issue of fact on this point, and I understand what might be the judicial impulse to think, "Well, this is an important enough technology that

surely such a market is going to develop." But I think that
the reasons for market failure in this particular context -and by "particular context," I really mean the context of trade
books in particular -- are enormous, and there was no real
dispute about those problems.

It's precisely why Meta abandoned the licensing route and chose to go the route that brought us here today, and I would note that the other major AI developers have used these similar online data sets, and we know that from the records in cases that they are currently litigating as well as -- as well as statements that they have made publicly.

And then the last thing I would say about these theories, before I conclude, is that the other theory that they advance in passing is this theory about the lost sale from the initial acquisition. And I think the response to that is that that is not cognizable for the simple reason that we could have trained our tools through other means.

We could have borrowed books from the San Francisco Public Library, leaving aside the impracticality of training on books one by one. And if we had made an unauthorized copy of those books, we could have trained on them without the payment that would have been the lost sale, under their view. And the <code>HathiTrust</code> District Court opinion, I believe, by Judge Baer in the Southern District of New York makes this point.

And I would just say one thing about what Mr. Boies had to

say about the issue of bad faith here, and that is simply that the important thing to remember here is that, by "bad faith," what the plaintiffs are really saying in this context is that we made an unauthorized copy from an unauthorized copy, perhaps even with knowledge that that was itself an unauthorized copy.

I think the Court is well aware of our legal arguments as to why bad faith shouldn't come into the analysis, and I won't say anything more about that unless the Court has any questions.

The final thing that I would say is that I think that so many of the Court's questions have been based on this very understandable concern about the effect that a ruling in our favor would have on creative industries.

But I do think that this is a problem that the copyright laws do not protect against, and that is this specific notion -- and the Supreme Court said this, I think, most clearly in *Eldred v. Ashcroft* -- that every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of publication.

And as other courts have said, progress -- intellectual progress is possible only if a new author is free to build on the work of existing ones.

And so, to use the example that you used with Mr. Boies, it is certainly true that other comics could come along and build on Sarah Silverman's memoir. They could write a memoir

in the style of Sarah Silverman. They could write a better memoir. All of that is going to have impacts on the sales of Sarah Silverman's own memoirs.

But copyright is meant to foster and encourage the creation of new noninfringing works. It may very well be that Llama and other AI tools --

THE COURT: What about machines?

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well, I think -- if machines do it, I think the same analysis would apply, leaving aside that there would be difficult questions down the road about who the --

THE COURT: Really? I mean, I don't know -- why would the same analysis apply if the machine is creating the work? I mean --

MR. SHANMUGAM: Because --

THE COURT: -- I thought that copyright was about human creativity.

MR. SHANMUGAM: Well, it is, but copyright is not intended to benefit authors at all costs. What copyright is intended to do is to protect the expressive components of what they produce and not the underlying ideas or the underlying facts. And that's precisely why, if someone comes along --

THE COURT: But -- but -- I mean, you know, we're balancing two things; right? One is, you know, sort of promoting the creativity of the authors who have the copyrighted works, and the other is using fair worst -- fair

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use to promote the creativity of others, you know, who might
 1
     want to use the copyrighted works as a springboard.
 2
          And if the machine is doing the creating, I -- is -- is
 3
     copyright interested in protecting the machine --
 4
                              Well, just to be clear --
 5
              MR. SHANMUGAM:
              THE COURT: -- the machine's ability to create?
 6
              MR. SHANMUGAM: -- the machine is not doing the
 7
     creating, at least now. When it comes to a tool like Llama,
 8
     humans are prompting Llama, and it's the humans who are really
 9
     using Llama as a tool to create --
10
11
              THE COURT: Yeah, but if I say -- if I -- but -- hold
12
     on.
          I mean, if I say, you know, "Write a funny memoir in the
13
     style of Sarah Silverman, " and then they write it, the machine
14
15
     is creating it. I'm not creating it. I have the idea for it,
    but I'm not creating it, and you -- you're the one who's
16
17
    hammering away at the distinction between ideas and creation;
18
     right?
          It's humans that are feeding an idea to the machine, and
19
     the machine is doing the creation; right?
20
              MR. SHANMUGAM: You're the one who is providing the
21
    prompts. You may provide substantial information to the tool
22
23
     in order to get the output and return. And, to be sure, there
     are difficult questions --
24
              THE COURT: If I call it "bipacking," is that what
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that's called?

 $\mbox{MR. SHANMUGAM:} \mbox{ It's not a term with which I'm}$ familiar.

But the broader point is that there are difficult questions in the law, to be sure. There are questions about, you know, who will hold the copyright for the output and so forth.

My point is simply that when we are thinking about how the copyright law, as it is presently written, operates in this area, regardless of how it is that subsequent works are produced, what the copyright law protects is the author's expression, which is embodied in the specific right to reproduce and the right to produce derivative works, and that's a limitation on what Mr. Boies suggested earlier.

Sarah Silverman does not have plenary protection over all of the ideas in her memoirs. That is the classic sort of building on prior ideas that the copyright laws protect. And, again, if the copyright laws are going to provide broader protection than that, that's a matter of Congress.

But this Court really doesn't need to get to that issue if it leaves aside the question of whether or not the effect on sales is cognizable in a case where there is simply no record that there is such an effect that would give rise to the legal question that you've been raising.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. It's very

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1
     interesting.
          I'll issue a ruling later today. Just kidding.
 2
                                (Laughter.)
 3
                           I will -- I will -- I will take a lot
 4
              THE COURT:
     longer to think about it and then issue a ruling.
 5
              THE CLERK: Court is adjourned.
 6
                  (Proceedings adjourned at 12:49 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Tuesday, May 6, 2025 DATE: Jun C. Pen James C. Pence-Aviles, RMR, CRR, CSR No. 13059 U.S. Court Reporter